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"ON NATURAL SUFFERING" (animal suffering in nature) ABSTRACT
Part 1 surveys wïTt>ng by previous philosophers on natural suffering.
Part 2 is in three sections. The first two sections investigate two fairly 
predictable answers to the question, "why wouldn't it be a good thing to try 
to relieve at least some natural suffering?" The two answers are, first, 
V  ^"because that would be to go against nature", and, second, "because that
would be to risk harm to the ecosystem". There is a third fairly
predictable answer to the question "why wouldn't it be a good thing to try 
to relieve at least some natural suffering?" Some people would probably say 
^because the time would be better spent trying to relieve suffering in the 
human realm". For reasons explained in the third section of Part 2, I evade 
this answer by positing a situation in which human realm suffering no 
longer exists. In this situation, where there is more scope for natural 
suffering relief, I put a new question: "why wouldn't it be a good thing to 
try to relieve as much natural suffering as possible?" The third section of 
Part 2 investigates several answers to this further question.
Part 3 considers various "accidental" human effects on levels of natural 
suffering. I investigate whether these various effects, considered
separately, can be thought of as good things, leaving aside the question of 
whether better things might replace them. For example, what if levels of 
natural suffering fall by reason of a fall in the number of natural lives? 
In nature lion cubs, for example, die mostly from starvation (mortality is 
80%). If human effect on nature endangers species in which extreme
suffering is routine, mightn't such human effect on nature be a good thing?
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INTRODUCTION
By "natural suffering", I mean animal suffering In nature. This thesis 
Is In three main parts:
Part 1 Is a brief survey of some writing on natural suffering contributed 
by previous philosophers,
Part 2 Is In three sections. The first two sections Investigate two fairly 
predictable answers to the question "why wouldn't It be a good thing to try 
to relieve at least some natural suffering?" The two answers are, first, 
"because that would be to go against nature", and, second, "because that 
would be to risk harm to the ecosystem". There Is a third fairly 
predictable answer to the question "why wouldn't It be a good thing to try 
to relieve at least some natural suffering?" Some people would probably say 
"because the time would be better spent trying to relieve suffering In the 
human realm". For reasons explained In the third section of Part 2, I evade 
this answer by positing a situation In which human realm suffering no 
longer exists. In this situation, where there Is more scope for natural 
suffering relief, I put a new question: "why wouldn't It be a good thing to 
try to relieve as much natural suffering as possible?" The third section of 
Part 2 Investigates several answers to this further question.
Part 3 considers various "accidental" human effects on levels of natural 
suffering, I Investigate whether these various effects, considered 
separately, can be thought of as good things, leaving aside the question of 
blether better things might replace them.
Part 1
PHILOSOPHERS AND NATURAL SUFFERING
What follows now is a brief survey of some writing on natural suffering 
contributed by previous philosophers. My survey is arranged in 
chronological thematic order - themes put in the order in which they were 
first raised. Within themes, chronological order of contribution applies.
The main focuses of previous writing have been various. For example:
1. Whether natural suffering relief would be absurd.
2. Whether It would destabilise the ecosystem.
3. Whether It would constitute Interference In a "foreign" realm.
4. Whether It would be what animals might rationally accept.
5. Whether It can be ruled out by a general suffering relief ethic.
A couple of weak and marginal objections to natural suffering relief have 
also been raised. I leave these until last.
1. Would natural suffering relief be absurd?
D. G. Ritchie <1) thought natural suffering relief would be self- 
evidently absurd. Because he thought the granting of animal rights would 
entail natural suffering relief, he used the supposed absurdity of natural 
suffering relief as an Instrument with which to beat animal rights. If we 
grant protection to animals against suffering from one source (humans), why 
not also protect them against suffering from other sources (other animals, 
the environment)? Actually, the entallment may not follow. For example, we 
may think It appropriate to regulate the behaviour of human sufferlng- 
Infllctors. But we may think It simply unworkable to recruit humans to 
police nature.
Rosllnd Godlovltch (2) raised another supposed absurdity, this time 
connected with natural suffering relief by death. She said that where we 
value an animal life at zero, but we negatively value Its suffering, any 
amount of Its suffering Indicates that we kill It. If then we are 
Interested In the suffering but not the lives of animals In general, 
extermination of all animal life Is Indicated, for all animals suffer at 
one time or another, this would be negative utilitarianism as applied to 
nature. But with natural suffering relief by death It needn't follow that 
we value the life, or lives, at zero. For example, we may want to shoot a 
buffalo dead If It le being mauled by a pride of lions. But only If It Is 
being mauled by a pride of lions.
It is the Ritchie-type claim of the self-evident absurdity of natural 
suffering relief which Stephen Clark (3) and Steve Sapontzls (4) have been 
concerned to rebut. Clark didn't think natural suffering relief would be 
absurd. Instead, he thought It would be beyond our Jurisdiction, and not 
b^at animals might rationally accept.
Sapontzls focused on the supposed absurdity of predation suffering 
relief. He looked at several different types of absurdity, and found that 
preventing predation fell under none of them. He found, and I agree, that:
1. Preventing predation Isn't logically absurd.
2. It Isn't factually absurd. (On, say. Mars, or Jupiter, It would be.)
3. It Isn't contextually absurd. The context Is suffering relief. There may 
be at least some cases of preventing predation (e.g. putting some animals 
In good zoos, Sapontzls thought) which would achieve suffering relief.
4. Preventing predation Isn't theoretically absurd, because Its parent 
ethic (suffering relief) Isn't absurd.
5. Practical absurdity doesn't apply. The example In (3) Is practical.
6. Unnatural absurdity doesn't apply. We routinely try to Improve upon 
nature, e.g. to prevent floods, avalanches, erosion, pestilence, diseases.
2. Would natural suffering relief destabilise the ecosystem?
Although he favoured building a few more zoos and putting bells on 
domestic cats, Sapontzls despite being a suffering reliever gave way easily 
to one objection to widespread predation suffering relief - that such 
suffering relief might destabilise the ecosystem. Another suffering 
reliever, Peter Singer, was likewise opposed to radical natural suffering 
relief. He said
... Judging by our past record, any attempt to change ecological 
systems on a large scale Is going to do far more harm than good. (5)
Only one writer, to my knowledge, has prompted us to question the Idea 
that radical "uncompensated for" natural suffering relief might destabilise 
the ecosystem. Suppose suffering relief was attempted by an engineered, or 
allowed, extinction of a predator species without attempt at adjustment 
elsewhere In the system. Eugene Hargrove expressed a perhaps surprising 
view that, according to ecological science,
... when a species becomes extinct, the system simply adjusts.
Some other creature comes forward and fills the ecological niche 
left vacant ... ecological theory weakens the preservationist case. 
Claims that current rates of extinction are unnatural and therefore 
Immoral are ... unconvincing, since massive extinctions over short 
periods of geological time have occurred on many occasions ... (6)
Unfortunately, Hargrove didn't quote any sources or statistics to back 
himself up. The claim that substitute species always await seems counter­
intuitive. For example, hundreds of millions of springboks once populated 
Southern Africa. Now, lone springboks sometimes wait six months before 
seeing a herd. (7) Are hundreds of millions of mark two springboks in 
prospect? It looks unlikely. Perhaps we should treat Hargrove's view with 
caution. But In any case natural suffering relief needn't go uncompensated 
for, so needn't destabilise the ecosystem. Eric Rakowskl (8) pointed out 
that prey population control, after predator extinction, could even prove 
commercially profitable If the meat or skin were In demand.
3. Would natural suffering relief be Interference In a "foreign" realm?
Clark (9) objected on other than ecological grounds to natural 
suffering relief. He raised two fundamental objections. First, such 
suffering relief would be beyond human jurisdiction. Second, animals might 
not be rational to accept natural suffering relief.
Clark made the point about jurisdiction by using two analogies. First, 
he compared species to nations. Second, he compared wild animals to Robert 
Nozlck's Independents (10), Wio have hired no protection agency. For Clark, 
natural suffering relief could be used as an excuse for extending the 
hegemony of the human "nation", and could provide an excuse for claiming 
some sort of protection payment from animal "nations". Wild animals are
not, like domestic animals, long assimilated among the .human nation's own 
"subjects", who receive care, and protection and pay for It by the 
advantages gained from them. Clark opposed human Intervention between wild 
species bAiere, between such species,
there seems to be a. settled relationship. (11)
A settled relationship could still Include quarrels, because Clark 
adopted the Nozlcklan principle that the protection agency's .domain
... does not extend to quarrels of non-clients among themselves. (12)
Clark's view of things can be attacked by extending one of his own
analogies. "Don't Interfere In Eastern bloc Internal affairs, there's a
/
settled relationship" was exactly the sort of message the Soviet Union 
often sent to the outside world about Its repressive relationships with Its 
former satellite nations In Eastern Europe. If Eastern bloc dissidents, 
quarrelling with their oppressors but without means of communication to the 
West, were mistreated, would It have been humane to write them off as non- 
clients of ours? In nature prey animals' not getting on with predators has 
even more dire Immediate consequences for them than once faced Eastern bloc 
dissidents, and the prey animals are In principle unable to call for our 
help. But It doesn*t seem to matter for Clark, If they are just non-clients 
or outsiders. Nobody has reproached Clark better than Rakowskl has:
... suppose the outsiders In question were ... neighbouring clans 
In some faraway land - and that the evils ... Included torture and 
murder. Would It really be a matter of moral Indifference whether 
or not we stepped In to halt the bloodshed If we easily could? (13)
4. Would animals be rational to accept natural suffering relief?
In his second paper Clark promoted another criterion for human
Interaction with other species. He suggested that we
... assess our practices by referring to what might rationally be 
accepted by all parties. (14)
At least here we have a mechanism for assessing what messages animals might 
send to us If they did have a means of communication. But, unsurprisingly, 
Clark didn't allow that he might have to deal with messages asking for 
Interference with settled, but painful, natural relationships. Clark
allowed that, for example, cattle might prefer domesticity to taking their 
chances with natural predators, but he thought people would prefer not to 
be the domestic "subjects" of others. So, unless animals are already
Irretrievably domesticated, he didn't allow that there are strong grounds 
not to prefer "freedom" for animals, as he supposed we would prefer it for 
ourselves. There are at least two problems here. One concerns
anthropocentricity. Another concerns Clark's wishful thinking.
10
First, anthropocentricity. Although putting ourselves In the place of, 
say, cattle might appear to be putting human interests to one side. In 
another sense putting ourselves In others' places always Involves taking 
human concerns with us. We are often Interested In being free, Independent, 
self-determined. We are often Interested In our national or group 
Identities. If like Clark we want to deduce what animals might want, we 
should be very wary about projecting all these human concepts onto them, or 
using what might be purely human preferences as a basis for assessment. It 
would be safer to rely upon known or estimated animal behaviour In actual 
or projected situations analogous to the comparisons we might want to make.
Take an example of a buffalo In the Masai Mara, a wild cousin of the 
domestic cow. Would the buffalo be rational to prefer domestication. If on 
offer, to running the gauntlet of the lions? For Clark It would seem we 
have to take Into consideration our sensibility that we wouldn't like being 
somebody else's domestic subjects. Since this sensibility Is such a strong 
feature of our own preferences, we would be quite rational to take It Into 
consideration If ge were candidates for domestication. But we are not. In 
this example the buffalo Is, and we have no evidence from the behaviour of 
Its already domesticated cousins that they want to escape domestication per 
se. though they may well shy away from the attentions of keepers who treat 
them particularly badly, or sense the nearness of the slaughterhouse If the 
tln^ of their culling approaches, and the methods of slaughter are 
Inhumane.
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Of course, one reason domestic cows don't attempt escape from their 
farms is that they are quite used to them. A newly-captured wild buffalo 
wouldn't be, and so would quite frequently be straining at its leash, or 
charging its captors or their fences. At least two more sorts of 
considerations are then relevant. First, would even this evidence of 
discontent outweigh the evidence In the wild that buffaloes try hard to 
escape predators, and If they fail, they are then visibly terrified as they 
are eaten alive? Second, what about future generations of buffalo? Even If 
we conclude that present generations would suffer particularly the shock of 
their captivity, and so on balance be less content. It may be that for 
future generations domestication would represent an Improvement on tooth- 
and-claw nature.
Clark might want to object that we haven't considered that most 
domestic bullocks remain just that - we rarely let them grow to be bulls. 
But here his wishful thinking about nature comes In. I have no figure for 
buffaloes, but we will see later how the chances of wild animals reaching 
adulthood are often considerably less than the slightly more than fifty 
percent chance for domestic cattle. (All the cows, plus a few bulls. ) We 
must face the practical Implications of the way natural selection works. 
Animals In the wild often die early, and as a rule they die horribly. It 
will take considerable human destruction and cruelty to match these factors 
where animals suffer at human hands. Even if we put purely human 
sensibilities about self-determination Into the equation, would we. In wild 
animals' places, so obviously prefer our theoretical freedom to self­
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determination, if our freedom from the awful dangers In our habitat was so 
limited? And in any case, how can wild animals "self-determine"?. Barring 
human intervention they are stuck with the cards dealt to them by nature. 
If they had human foresight Into their chances of suffering, might they not 
actually prefer not only humane domestication, but even human hunters' 
bullets? Of course they lack foresight, but I raise the question of whether 
lack of foresight In the would-be sufferer Is justification for our letting 
the suffering go ahead.
A final consideration. Even If buffaloes opted for domestication, 
remember Clark referred to "all parties". For example, what might the lions 
have to say on the matter? Mightn't they object. If their fate is now 
premature extinction? (Assume It's not economically viable to slphon-off 
some bull buffalo-meat to feed them. ) We might then have a very hard 
choice. But we might need to consider whether to let some animals .continue 
to live If this maintains suffering elsewhere In the system. (Most lions 
die of starvation anyway, as we will see later. >
5- Cap a general suffering relief ethic rule out natural suffering relief?
The permutations Involved In trying to calculate net suffering relief 
in the last example, and in many others, might be mind boggling. But 
writers have emphasized that a consistent suffering relief ethic can't rule 
out natural suffering relief in principle.
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Baird Callicot's view (15) was that a consistent suffering relief ethic 
can't put off at least an attempt at natural suffering relief, just by 
reason of the enormity of the total scope for natural suffering relief. 
With tongue In cheek, Peter Wenz suggested as a utilitarian policy that 
predators be eliminated. Further, he suggested that
... prey populations can be kept in check painlessly by 
sterilisation, the control of breeding sites, and so forth, thereby 
preserving the ecological balance. (16)
We could argue about whether predators actually need to be eliminated, or 
whether Instead prey animals' painful deaths could simply be anaesthetised, 
for example by the use of tranqulliser dart guns. We could argue that the 
labour-lntenslveness of natural suffering relief, from starvation and 
disease as well as predation, would make human realm suffering relief a 
better Investment of time and energy. We could argue that we would In any 
case find few recruits to police nature, so It might be more realistic to 
look for cases where we can relieve natural suffering slnq>ly by letting 
things go - allowing an endangered predator species to disappear, possibly. 
But still Calllcot and Wenz have a point. Consistent suffering relievers 
have at least to put natural suffering relief on their list of priorities. 
If only at the end. On active natural suffering relief Rakowskl said
... the only sound reasons for Inaction are contingent ones. (17)
uRakowskl gave as sound contingent reasons for Inaction the more urgent 
concerns of human beings, and the danger of counterproductiveness. But he 
said the urgency of our other concerns could change, and we could devise 
ways of circumventing counterproductiveness. So for Rakowskl suffering 
relievers should at least keep active natural suffering relief on their 
list. In case of these eventualities. But passive natural suffering relief. 
If constituted say by letting endangered predator species die out, needn't 
wait for our other concerns to change. We could Just let It happen. We 
might even be able to redeploy present conservation effort Into active 
suffering relief of some kind.
Weak and marginal objections to natural suffering relief
There have been a couple of weak and marginal objections to natural 
suffering relief. The first was made by Tom Regan (18), and concerns 
predation suffering relief. It states that predators are not moral agents, 
so can't be asked not to engage In predation, so there Is nothing bad about 
predation. Sapontzls (19) answered by saying that It Is humans, not natural 
predators, that we might be asking to act morally, to prevent harm; and 
harm can be Inflicted by other than moral agents and still be harm. A small 
child may not be a moral agent, but If It swings a cat this Is still 
harmful. Calllcot, ever pleased to remind animal liberators of the full 
Implications of their own ethic, answered:
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Imagine the authorities explaining to the parents of a small child 
tortured and killed by a certlflably brain-damaged sadist that, 
even though he had a history of this sort of thing he Is not 
properly a moral agent therefore has to be allowed to remain at 
large pursuing a course of action to which he Is Impelled by drives 
he cannot control. (20)
Above we see a pertinent consideration for the "animal rights" 
objection to predation suffering relief, made on the grounds that such 
suffering relief would violate predator animal "rights" to live a normal 
life. A normal life for a predator Includes tormenting and, usually 
painfully, killing other sentient beings. If this behaviour was taking 
place among humans, there would be no question of respecting the freedom of 
the perpetrator to roam, or even to reproduce. Which brings me again to 
Rakowskl, this time on natural suffering relief by sterilisation of 
predators: .
Suppose that certain kinds of violent criminal behaviour were 
genetically transmitted from human parents to their progeny, so 
that the latter were certain to rob, rape, or murder unless kept 
under close surveillance or confinement. Surely It would not be 
reprehensible to prevent such people from reproducing If It would 
cost the community dearly to keep their children under close watch 
or lock and key. (21)
16
The second, weak objection to natural suffering relief was made by 
Stephen Bostock. He said '
A tacit admission that wild life must be reasonably pleasant Is '
that no-pne would suggest It was cruel or unkind not to capture 
any animal. (22)
This statement Is open to . an easy objection. What humans would suggest 
about the character of wild life Is likely to be a very poor guide to Its
real character. Humans are very prone to wishful thinking (perhaps to keep 
sane). We like to think we are living In a more benevolent world than Is 
actually the case. We also have a vested Interest In not being motivated to 
do anything onerous about natural suffering, so will be quite pleased to 
take refuge In a belief that wild life Is reasonably pleasant.
Conclusion
My brief survey of previous writing Is now complete. Natural suffering 
relief has been deemed by previous writers to be, variously, absurd, 
ecologically destabilising, none of our business, (literally) uncalled for, 
a threat to "animal rights" and, anyway, unnecessary. I hope It has been 
seen that most of these objections are at least seriously challenged.
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Part 2, Section 1 
A THING AGAINST NATURE
Why wouldn't it be a good thing to try to relieve at least some natural 
suffering? One fairly predictable answer would be "because that would be to 
go against nature". According to this answer, natural suffering relief 
couldn't be a good thing, by mere definition of It being "a thing against 
nature". But then It has to follow that. In some sense, nature Is good. Can 
this be true? To try to find out, this section Investigates some specific 
claims for the goodness of nature.
At first It may seem that we have to deal with claims for the goodness 
of nature from both secular and religious camps, and that this Is going to 
be a complicated business. Not necessarily so. In fact. The claims may be 
one and the same. Believers In a good God may be committed first to belief 
In a nature which Is good, or which will turn out to be. For If It Isn't 
good, or doesn't turn out to be, then God either might not be seen as good. 
If he Is responsible for nature, or he might be seen as Inept or of limited 
ability, something few religious believers can countenance. So secular and 
religious nature-worshlppers alike may want to claim first for the goodness 
of nature, without yet making reference to God - religious nature- 
worshlppers may not want to rely on claims for the goodness of nature which 
Invoke a good God. God's character. If he exists, may be seen from his 
works, not the other way round.
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The claims below about the goodness of nature may be made separately or 
together.
1. The natural world Is "the best of all possible worlds". Compared to
other possible worlds, It Is therefore good.
2. Nature is good because Its sublimity and majesty help make us wholly 
human. Without opportunity for the contemplation of nature we would be 
condemned to live one-dlmenslonal, less than wholly human lives.
3. Nature Is good because It "teaches" us certain moral qualities.
4. Nature is good at least partly because "natural evil" (to be explained,
but including natural suffering) In particular Is necessary, that we have
the opportunity for moral growth,
5. Nature is good because it has produced us.
6. Nature is good because It contains variety, and variety Is good.
I now deal with each of the above claims separately, to see whether each
has any relevance for natural suffering relief.
23
1. "Nature Is the best of all possible worlds"
If we take "nature" here to mean the whole of "God's Creation", i.e. 
the universe, this claim Is the conclusion of the theodicy of Leibniz. (1) 
If It Is reached just by trying, and falling, to Imagine a better world 
than nature that could have been created, then at least this route to the 
conclusion refers to something, nature, though the characters of other 
"possible worlds" are left to the Imagination. Leibniz's own route to the 
conclusion Is, "an all-good God exists, therefore creates the best of all 
possible worlds". Just where do we look, without looking at nature, to 
establish whether an all-good God exists?
Suppose, though, we leave God out of this. What can we make of a 
statement that nature Is the best of all possible worlds? It might make 
some sense to say that nature as created was the "best" of all possible 
worlds. For the atheist, either because It was the only possible world - no 
God to Improve on It - or because other models were somehow available but 
Inferior,
There is of course a considerable difficulty, not to say Impossibility, 
with Inspecting the credentials of other "possible worlds" to enable 
comparison with our own, at least at the time of "creation" or at some 
given prehistoric date. But anyway, surely the neo-Lelbnlzian "best 
possible world" claim doesn't address the question of whether nature Is the 
best world now. Whether or not a God still has other possible worlds
24
available, someone else certainly has. That someone else is us. are here 
now, yg. can change our world, wg. can change nature in some sense. We can 
(in theory) relieve some natural suffering, with tranquiliser dart guns for 
example. Some of us may already be "accidentally" relieving some natural 
suffering, for example where hunters' bullets give quicker and less painful 
deaths to animals than their starving to death or being eaten alive by 
natural predators, The question is, would a world in which net natural 
suffering relief had been achieved be a better world (other things equal) 
than nature as it is how? And why wouldn't it be a better world?
Preamble to "nature is good" claims 2 & 3
Holmes Rolston (2) identified seven senses in which we can and do, or 
can't and don't, "follow nature". The last four senses are all sub­
divisions of the third sense. The first two senses are, rather trivially, 
first, we can't help but follow the laws of nature, second, in the opposite 
sense, every thing or action we make can't help but be artifactual rather 
than natural: the product of human rather than natural creation.
Four more senses of "follow nature" are "relative" for Rolston - by 
which he meant different human actions can be rated either as more or as 
less natural than one another, in the senses given. In the first "relative" 
sense, we can tend to respect, or alternatively risk upsetting, nature's 
equilibrium, with whatever consequences. In the second relative sense, we
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could, perhaps like Nietzsche, glorify, or recommend human imitation of, 
nature's continual warring, for in nature, as Rolston observed, creatures 
are
... condemned to live by attacking other life. (3)
Rolston was here at pains to put some distance between himself and 
Nietzsche. In fact, rather tending to undermine his own eventual 
conclusion, Rolston said
Nature proceeds with an absolute recklessness that is not only 
indifferent to life, but results in senseless cruelty which is 
repugnant to our moral sensibilities. Life is wrested from her 
creatures by continual struggle, usually soon lost; and those 
"lucky" few who survive to maturity only face more extended 
suffering and eventual collapse in disease and death. With what 
indifference nature casts forth to slaughter ... a hundred 
minnows, and a dozen rabbits, so that one of each might survive.
Things are no sooner sprouted, hatched, or born than they are 
attacked; life is unrelieved stress, until sooner or later, swiftly 
or by inches, fickle nature crushes out the life she gave, and the 
misery is finally over. All we can be sure of from the hands of 
nature is ... a gory blood bath; she permits life only in agony.
The world's last word is what the Buddhists call duhkha. suffering. (4)
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But Rolston then introduced two senses in which he suggested we 
"follow nature". These form the bases of the next two claims on my list; 
nature is good because contemplation of its sublimity and majesty makes us 
wholly human, and nature is good because it "teaches" us moral qualities. 
Rolston said that these benefits actually join with nature's horrors as if 
both are parts of a musical symphony: the horrors form what he called the 
"minor key" section of the symphony!
2. "Nature is good because contemplation of it makes us wholly human"
Rolston suggested we follow our own human natures, which to be
complete, he thought, are composed of at least three "dimensions". First, 
paradoxically, we are
... the animal for whom it is natural to be artificial ... (5)
so we need some scope to exercise the creative part of our nature, to build 
the artificial rather than rely entirely upon the natural. Second, however, 
we still need to harness nature to feed and nurture ourselves. Third, we 
need nature's sublimity and majesty, both that of gardened nature like
domestic countryside, and, even more especially perhaps, wild nature like 
the High Sierra, though many of us will rarely set foot in this nature. Its 
very existence may suffice to inspire us. Rolston said that one facet alone
of human nature makes us less than wholly human. For example.
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... a purely urban person is a one-dimensional person; only those 
who add the rural and the wild are three-dimensional persons. As 
for myself, I consider life morally atrophied when respect for and 
appreciation of the naturally wild is absent. No one has learned 
the full scope of vdiat it means to be moral until he has learned 
to respect the integrity and worth of those things we call wild. (6)
Neither I nor (I suspect) many sensitive people would deny that some 
form of access, whether physical or imaginative, to "wildness" is crucial 
to both our aesthetic and moral fulfilment, even to our sanity, in an 
increasingly structured, regulated, complicated world. For example, 
advocates of the remorseless advance of tarmac over English countryside, at 
the rate of a hundred more square miles covered every year (7) certainly 
seem both aesthetically and morally atrophied if they fail to recognise the 
sublimity and majesty of the landscape they are destroying.
The problem for Rolston, though, is that he just doesn't need to 
preserve everything that goes on in nature in order to preserve quite 
adequate access to "wildness". In fact I suspect most sensitive people 
would love to witness all but the last of the following "wild" scenes from 
their windows: a sunrise, thunder and lightning, a rainbow, waves crashing 
against a shore, the silhouettes of cliffs and mountains against a sunset, 
and - lions dragging a buffalo down to a violent and horrific death.
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I fall to see how, if for example some endangered predator species are 
let die out, and any overpopulation of their prey animals is controlled via 
the tranquiliser dart gun, we lose the vast wildness of the waves of the 
sea, the majesty of the cliffs and mountains, the sublime tranquility of 
the sunset, the night sky, the awesome ancient silence of the deep 
countryside or wilderness. (8) Rolston simply doesn't need to take nature 
as a whole package. Why wouldn't nature be even better, if we could 
contemplate its undisputed glories and know that at least some of its 
horrors had disappeared?
3. "Nature is good because it "teaches" us certain moral qualities"
Rolston's final sense of "follow nature" is what he called the 
"tutorial" sense. For Rolston
... those vdio understand the "seasonal" character of life are the 
better able to rejoice in the turning of the seasons and to do 
everything well in its time ... Encounter with nature integrates 
me, protects me from pride, gives a sense of proportion and place, 
teaches me what to expect, and what to be content with, establishes 
other value than my own, and releases feelings in my spirit that I 
cherish and do not find elsewhere. (9)
His conclusion was that
29
. .. exposure to natural wildness is as necessary for a true 
education as the university, (10)
So from nature we may learn moral qualities such as awareness of 
interdependence, humility, patience, asceticism and unselfishness.
What response is due to the claim that nature is good because It 
teaches us certain moral qualities? We might be tempted to make a response 
that is similar to my response to the previous claim. We could say that we 
can take a dose of moral education from nature's bottle. Just as we can 
take a dose of wildness, but we don't have to drink the whole bottle. 
Having taken a dose requisite for our needs, we can by natural suffering 
relief dilute the remaining contents to make them more palatable, as it 
were, for animals.
However, the above response is less satisfactory in the case of nature 
teaching us certain moral qualities. In performing or permitting natural 
suffering relief, we might be said to be displaying or tolerating the 
opposites of exactly the qualities implied by Rolston. We might be said, by 
our actions or omissions, to be repudiating the very education nature had 
Just given us. Rolston might say that our involvement or complicity with 
natural suffering relief would constitute an example of losing our "sense 
of proportion or place" in relation to nature. It might not be "our place" 
to interfere with nature. We might start getting other ideas above our 
station too - taking it upon ourselves to reorganize nature generally.
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where we are not doing so already: trying to play God, in fact. The general 
picture is that we commit sins of pride, give ourselves pride of place, and 
jettison self-discipline. In the context of natural suffering, therefore, 
we have to decide which is more important: suffering relief with "pride", 
or "following nature'V with humility. '
If we think suffering relief is more important than "following nature"; 
do we though have to reject the moral qualities implied by Rolston? We 
don't. Awareness of interdependence we can demonstrate by trying to make 
sure that attempts at natural suffering relief aren't counter-productive. 
For example, suppose we don't let a predator species die out without trying 
to make sure we are able to painlessly cull any resultant overpopulation of 
prey animals. We can still be humble about our smallness and insignificance 
in relation to the universe, and be aware how fragile we are if our "pride" 
in other contexts, such as nuclear technology, gets out of control. It 
doesn't follow that if we are impatient about continued facilitation of 
natural suffering by conservationists, we are also impatient to dispense 
with nature's way of doing things in other contexts, eager to sanitize 
nature generally or exploit it ruthlessly for our own material gain. We 
simply have to be clear about which parts of nature we don't like, and be 
clear that suffering relief, not playing God, is our ideal.
In the end natural suffering relief may still get seen in some quarters 
as an example of humans taking too much upon themselves. Some suffering- 
relievers may indeed be dubiously motivated. But maybe here we can take
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advantage of dubious motivation. We needn't let it spread to contexts where 
we can't take advantage of it. Just how well motivated, anyway, are those 
people who would Indulge their own "education" from nature at the expense 
of continuing to allow what Rolston himself referred to as nature's
... senseless cruelty which is repugnant to our moral 
sensibilities? (11) .
And so Just how moral would these people be?
4. "ExejLjaat:ujcal evil is_goo<L because it enables moral growth"
"Natural evil" means naturally occurring pain and suffering, in the 
theological literature, I have been using "natural suffering" to refer to 
any suffering that is not experienced or inflicted by humans, or, more 
succinctly, animal suffering in nature. However, the theological literature 
includes under "natural evil" certain "natural" misfortunes that happen to 
humans, for example diseases and earthquakes. Perhaps eventually we will be 
able to conquer diseases and anticipate and avoid earthquakes, even conquer 
natural animal suffering, but it seems that if much "natural evil" is 
conquered, then the theologians will not necessarily be pleased. For one of 
the more prominent theodicies has been based on the argument that natural 
evil is in a sense good - becauses it enables moral growth. Then, the 
argument goes, if even natural evil is good, nature must be good. (And for
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theologians of course, this reflects well on the designer of nature, even 
demonstrates there Ig. a designer of nature. >
So let's look at the claim that even natural evil is in a sense good, 
because it enables moral growth. (Note that because animals don't grow 
morally, any natural evils occuring to animals have to be good for hnmnn 
moral growth!) A version of the supporting argument appears below - It is 
the version put by Richard Swinburne.
If men are to have knowledge of the evil which will result from 
their actions or negligence, laws of nature must operate regularly; 
and that means that there will be what I may call "victims of the
system" ... if. men are to have the opportunity to bring about
serious evils for themselves or others by actions or negligence, or 
to prevent their occurrence, and if all knowledge of the future is 
obtained by normal induction, that is induction from patterns of 
similar events in the past - then there must be serious natural 
evils occuring to man.or animals. (12)
John Hick, in similar vein, said that
A world without problems, difficulties, perils and hardships 
would be morally static. For moral and spiritual growth comes
through response to challenges; and in a paradise there would be no
challenges. (13)
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Three responses spring to mind. First, although we could admit that we 
do indeed learn things through attempting to meet challenges, we can point 
out that this feature of life doesn't normally make us regard the thing or 
person vdiich presents the challenge as good - far from it. Hitler presented 
us with challenges. As D. Z. Phillips said in reply to the theodicy 
relevant here.
What then are we to say of the child dying of cancer? ... If this 
has been done to anyone, it is bad enough, but to be done for a 
purpose, to be planned from eternity - that is the deepest evil. If 
God is this kind of agent, he cannot justify his actions, and his 
evil nature is revealed. (14)
So the fact that nature sets challenges won't make it, or its designer, 
good. Second, we can say that the whole point of a challenge is to meet it. 
Why can't we treat natural suffering as a challenge? After all, as Steve 
Sapontzis said.
We routinely interfere with nature in order to protect ourselves 
(and animals, too) from such threats to (the quality of) life as 
flooding rivers, storms, avalanches, erosion, pestilence, diseases, 
birth defects, infections, and decay. (15)
We don't, normally, deliberately meet a challenge badly, with the idea 
that such incompetence will preserve the challenge to test future
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generations - so they can also meet it badly to preserve it for their own 
offspring. We would be perverse to see challenges as good things, worth 
preserving in this way. In spite of what Hick says, in a way we aim at 
paradise - we try to get rid of challenges which bar our way to it, even if 
new challenges arise all the time, so any overall progress is difficult to 
discern. Of course, if we ever did eliminate suffering, we might then 
suffer from boredom, but this strange paradox doesn't seem to stop us 
always wanting to reduce avoidable suffering for the time being. We 
certainly wouldn't be content with the lot of some wild animal species in 
nature, barring human intervention - to be faced for endless generations 
with the normality of early, and violent or prolonged, deaths with no 
prospect whatever of social progress. The religious idea that eternal 
natural animal suffering has been arranged as part of a nature that enables 
human moral growth really is quite repugnant.
The third reply to Swinburne and Hick can be made along the lines of, 
"Well, what would be so bad about a paradise, then?" Though the present 
laws of nature may well have been necessary to give us the challenges we 
have faced, a paradise might also have its own, perhaps greater, merits! 
Brian Davies said
... it is true that there are virtues which could not be present 
in a paradise. There could not be courage, for example, for that 
presupposes danger ... But there seems no reason why people in 
paradise should not be able to love and do good ... There would be
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no struggle to deal with pain and suffering and to overcome it. But 
that would, surely, be a very good thing - better, indeed, than 
there being a world in which to be a person is to be involved in a
need to struggle to deal with pain and suffering and to overcome
them. A paradise would have no martyrs. But who wants martyrs?
Even martyrs, presumably, do not . .. (16)
When challenges are at a minimum, it doesn't mean they are non-existent.
The challenge "to love and do good", as Davies puts it, would still exist.
And unless and until there seems to be a danger of suffering from boredom 
that outweighs other suffering, it still seems we can improve the world by 
suffering relief, including perhaps natural suffering relief.
5. "Nature is good because it has produced us"
Natural suffering has accompanied the process of evolution, which has 
produced human beings. Our emergence from this process may be thought a 
good thing, making nature good. Would it be wise to interfere with the 
process of evolution, by natural suffering relief or whatever means?
But the above "nature is good" claim doesn't undermine the idea of 
natural suffering relief. First, it can be said that our being a good 
product of evolution, if this is true, needn't rule out our interfering 
with evolution outside its direct applicability to our further development.
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Second, even if Interference with evolution does, or may, prevent some 
positive developments, does the possibility of these developments always 
have to veto interference with evolution? Suppose even that some aliens had 
arrived on Earth before the evolution of humans, and these aliens had in 
fact inadvertently prevented the evolution of humans, by relieving some 
natural suffering that was around at the time. Why automatically assume 
that the aliens would have done better to leave things well alone?
6, "Nature is good because it contains variety, and variety is good"
There is something to be said for the idea that variety is better than 
sameness. It is certainly more interesting. The question, though, is Just 
how far we prioritize variety in relation to other considerations.
Nature conservationists sometimes go to extraordinary lengths to 
preserve the full variety of animal species. This was demonstrated by a 
recent news item about an endangered species, the black rhinoceros. Black 
rhinos are falling victim to poachers in Zimbabwe at a rate which indicates 
that the species will soon be extinct, unless something is done to save it. 
To regenerate the species, nature conservationists in Zimbabwe have decided 
that some rhinos need to be relocated away from poachers, so they can 
reproduce in peace. The new location chosen is Australia! A small group of 
black rhinos has already been transported there by aircraft, with a long 
stopover (some months) for quarantine on an island in the Indian Ocean.
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Unfortunately there were only two males in the group, one of which seemed 
rather sickly and which died in quarantine. The object of the exercise was 
then defeated in Australia vdien the remaining male, having been cooped up 
for so long, was released from his crate and couldn't cope with his sudden 
freedom - he went beserk, charged a perimeter fence and died of head 
injuries. Now the conservationists want to introduce the Zimbabwe female 
rhinos to male rhinos which live in Australian zoos.
Nature conservationists' concern with preserving the full variety of 
animal species leads them to take steps which involve very morally dubious 
treatment of animal individuals. Indeed, analogous treatment of human 
Individuals would be regarded as morally outrageous. I heard recently that 
the last monolingual Cornish speaker had died. Suppose some lingual 
conservationists had wanted, a few decades ago, to preserve this breed. 
Would the conservationists have been morally justified in rounding up a 
group of Cornish speakers, transporting them to an island in the Atlantic 
away from the influence of English speakers, and encouraging them to 
reproduce among themselves until a sustainable Cornish speaking population 
could be re-introduced to Cornwall? Rather than put up with the violation 
of human rights that all this would involve, we would allow the variety of 
languages spoken in Britain to decrease in number. We simply wouldn't 
regard variety as that important. So there must at least be a question mark 
against variety's fitness to serve as a moral "trump", outplaying the 
considerations of rights or suffering of sentient beings. Variety isn't 
necessarily good, nor are contexts (e.g. nature) in which variety features.
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The contrast between treatment of rare animale, and "rare" humans Is 
Interesting. In some respects we don* t seem to regard animals as beings at 
all. What is the best analogy for how we see wild animals? I agree with 
Eugene Hargrove* s answer. He said
... the best analogy is a mass-produced toy ... The child's 
interest in the figure is primarily as an exemplification of the 
design, Just as our natural (or cultural) interest in the 
individual animal is as an exemplification of the species ... the 
child may do things with the figure that eventually causes its head 
or arm to fall off ... Likewise, we are interested in using 
wildlife ... letting them be eaten by other animals, or letting 
them starve to death so as to preserve the natural character of the 
landscape. (17)
Conclusion
Neither the last mentioned, nor any of the previous "nature is good" 
claims establish that nature is sufficiently "good" to make the 
unnaturalness of natural suffering relief a major moral problem. Nature is 
in places sublime and majestic, but in other places suffering goes on that 
needn't continue In order for sublimity, majesty and wildness still to 
obtain. A world including careful natural suffering relief would be a 
better world, other.things equal. We needn't throw out the baby of nature
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with the bathwater of natural suffering. If the bathwater is in places 
scalding the baby, perhaps this is not to be regarded merely as .a lesson 
for our future. Perhaps we might help out the baby now.
We are happy to watch natural history programmes about how the survival 
of the fittest produced But if a god asked us to fight amongst each
other to evolve future beings who could in turn enjoy and value our 
sacrifice for producing them, would we be so happy? We wouldn't regard as 
"good" a nature in which yg. were the sacrificial objects, either for 
evolution, or for the stability of the existing ecosystem. So why regard as 
"good" a nature which sacrifices other creatures?
In some areas we see sense. Lions at Jersey Zoo are fed with the 
carcasses of domestic bullocks supplied by the local slaughterhouse. (18)
The bullocks aren't slaughtered naturally, but do we seriously think it
would be good to put the lions among the live bullocks, that they may help
themselves to their food in the natural way?
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Part 2, Section 2 
A THING AGAINST THE SYSTEM
I have tried to show that claims for the goodness of nature don't form 
a basis for rejecting natural suffering relief. Nature is just not good in 
the required sense, though it may be good for some things. So let's put the 
question again. Why wouldn't it be a good thing to try to relieve at least 
some natural suffering? Another fairly predictable answer would be "because 
that would be to risk harm to the ecosystem". According to this answer, 
natural suffering relief wouldn't be a good thing, by reason of it being a 
"thing against the system". But then it has to follow that the ecosystem is 
good for something. What is it good for? What is needed from the ecosystem? 
Whatever the thing in question is, is the ecosystem the best means of its 
delivery? If not, perhaps the system needs adjusting. Mightn't natural 
suffering relief actually be a means of adjustment?
So, what is the ecosystem for? First, what system, precisely, are we 
talking about? In the last section we encountered claims that nature is or 
was good: good for our aesthetic and moral education, good for bringing
about the very evolution of humans, etc. Was is the interesting word here. 
The nature that evolved us is not the same nature we now inhabit. Once it 
was a non-human ecosystem. Now it’s a partly human one: we are part of it. 
If once nature was "for" our evolution, this can no longer be. Nature will 
have to be "for" something else. Which purpose, which system, is wanted?
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So human beings have evolved. But this needn* t stop us retaining an 
anthropocentric perspective, for the moment. We could continue with an 
anthropocentric perspective by regarding the present ecosystem as serving 
the primary purpose of providing a congenial environment in which we humans 
can prosper. But then it is difficult to see how this purpose would be 
served optimally by a "don't tamper with natural suffering" recommendation. 
If it is thought that the point in favour of evolution is that it has 
produced ys, well, we are here now. So preserving evolutionary processes, 
by non-interference with natural predation, starvation, etc, is no longer 
necessary. We could perhaps experiment with nature in attempts to further 
our own prosperity. We could do some more livestock farming, and to 
facilitate this we could cull some more wolves, in areas where they still 
exist. If we treated our livestock well, possibly we would cause a net 
decrease in natural suffering, and we would further our own prosperity. 
Why, then, should we retain the maxim "don't tamper with natural 
suffering"? The maxim gets in the way.
There is another major problem for opponents of natural suffering 
relief if they orient mainly towards human welfare. In the last paragraph I 
constructed an example in which wolves were a threat to further human 
prosperity. They might deprive us of "our" sheep. Perhaps though it could 
be argued that we only need more sheep for further prosperity - not to keep 
us from starving. What if some wild predators are in direct competition 
with humans for prey animal food - for survival, in fact?
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If we value human over animal life, and we have the motivation to kill 
both the predators in direct competition with us, and the prey we are 
competing for, why don't we just allow our population to rise at the 
expense of animal populations until the point where we might fall foul of 
the law of diminishing returns? We could finish off animal populations 
altogether if turning their habitat over to arable farming was more cost- 
effective than continuing in our carnivorous habits.
If human welfare is the primary purpose, there is great difficulty with 
ruling out tampering with nature - and so, with natural suffering - in 
cases where humans might be highly motivated, through commercial gain or 
survival, to tamper with nature. There might be cases where we are so 
highly motivated that we gain by, or need to create, a whole new ecological 
balance to replace the present one. The new balance would be, in effect, a 
new ecosystem. If human welfare is the primary purpose, this new ecosystem 
should be preferable to the present one. But the maxim "don't tamper with 
natural suffering" couldn't possibly be held to, at least not until it 
could be deployed in defence of an ecosystem that constituted some set of 
consequences regarded as optimal. Unless, possibly, we are pessimistic, 
cautious and conservative to a quite extraordinary degree, and tend to 
regard all grandiose human projects as ultimately counter-productive, a 
point to which I will return. In the meantime, let's consider a view held 
by an opponent of natural suffering relief who isn't primarily human- 
oriented.
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Stephen Clark (1) thought that, for example, we have no good reason to 
take a squirrel's nuts, any more than white men had good reason to take the 
crops and labour of non-white people. Now hypothesize to a situation rather 
like the one I presented earlier, in which, this time, humans are competing 
with squirrels for nuts as a matter of survival. Suppose too we are talking 
about the relatively rare red squirrel, as opposed to the grey squirrel 
which is often prone to overpopulation. So the contrived, but instructive, 
extremity of the situation would probably have been brought about by gross 
human overpopulation. It would seem that, for Clark, "surplus" humans, 
being members of the species that had grown "too" big, would still have no 
good reason to take food that the squirrels would be wanting to eat. For 
Clark, no good reason "any more than" white men vrtio are "surplus" would 
have good reason to take non-whites' food, if we were to replace "humans" 
in the example with "white men", and "squirrels" in the example with "non­
whites". Opponents of natural suffering relief like Clark don't orient 
themselves to a particular species, but tend to orient themselves away from 
species with runaway population levels. So "surplus" or potential new 
members of species with runaway population levels will tend to have their 
individual interests disregarded. If these surplus members are non-human 
animals and already living, such as grey squirrels, a periodic cull may be 
favoured, to cope with the overpopulation. The matter of "surplus" humans 
is different in practice, since few people favour a cull or neglect of 
surplus humans. However, some people favour the disregarding of individual 
interests of potential new humans - they tend to favour readily available 
abortion especially in places where human overpopulation is most acute.
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The Idea that "nature's balance" is best not tampered with lies behind 
the view that there is something bad about a species with a runaway 
population level. Nature left to Its own devices is seen as a self­
regulating mechanism, and though parts of the mechanism (e.g. predation) 
are painful for living creatures, preservation of the whole mechanism 
intact is seen as too important for us to be risking an attempt at 
smoothing the operation of some of its parts (e.g. by natural suffering 
relief). Runaway overpopulation is seen rather as an overwound mainspring 
would be seen by a watchmaker - in danger of breaking the mechanism.
Instead of runaway overpopulation of one species over another species, 
"species-blind" (as opposed to human-oriented) opponents of natural 
suffering relief prefer what Clark called a "settled relationship" (2) 
between population levels of species. However, both concepts "runaway" and 
"settled" are problematic. "Runaway" from what level, and at what rate? 
"Settled" at what level, and over what timespan? Suppose we take a period 
"just" before early human civilization evolved, and say for the sake of 
argument that, over this period, population levels between other species 
were "settled". Then humans begin to cross the seas, colonize new land 
masses and do some hunting of other species not hunted before by humans. Do 
these developments constitute "runaway" human overpopulation and an 
"unsettling" of the natural ecosystem? Even if the sizes of the new human 
colonies then remain stable over several centuries, and their hunting 
doesn't much affect the population level of prey animals? (Perhaps because 
humans have simply replaced the previous top predator?)
4 8
As I argued near the beginning of this section, "nature", changes, and 
as there was once a non-human ecosystem, there is now a partly human 
ecosystem. Allowing "no tampering" with the pre-civilization ecosystem, all 
those centuries ago, would have prevented all human development since, 
including the development of morality itself! So perhaps the moral maxim 
"don't tamper with nature" has to be somewhat time-dependent. But if we 
then try to agree on a time (and therefore agree on a particular "balance", 
a particular ecosystem) what are our criteria for selection? A time when 
the number of humans was tiny? Or (perhaps because that time featured 
insufficient moral development, included slavery, etc) a later time, by 
when there were a few more of us around, and we had developed at least some 
moral habits? At what time (perhaps it has passed already) will there be 
"too many" humans, or at v^at level and at what rate of increase will our 
population be excessive? Our population growth has had a tendency to send 
other species to their extinction. If species-blind opponents of natural 
suffering relief count this tendency against us, what are the criteria for 
preferring, say, rare black rhinos to "surplus" humans? What would an 
ecosystem reintroducing black rhinos be f or? Why are black rhinos 
desirable? Would it be a good thing to reintroduce Tyrannosaurus Rex, if we 
found some of its eggs in frozen animation in Siberia?
Faced with my barrage of questions as to precisely which time, which 
set of consequences they prefer and why, species blind opponents of natural 
suffering relief may now be exasperated. They may say "Well, let's Just try 
our moral maxim now. "
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Any previous human tampering with natural suffering is now a fait 
accompli. From now on, is there any crucial sense in which things are 
likely to get worse if we tamper with natural suffering? What further
arguments, if any, can be mustered against natural suffering relief?
As we have seen, species-blind opponents of natural suffering relief
face difficult questions in trying to justify one species ratio over
another. Good or bad consequences for tAiom. exactly, and why? We are drawn 
into questions about the relative values of different types of lives. But 
instead they could try tackling a suffering relief ethic on its own 
territory. They could try to argue that attempts at natural suffering 
relief would be prohibitively dangerous in that they might lead to greater 
suffering than exists already. If this argument succeeds, then the natural 
ecosystem in its present state could be seen as being "for", or at least 
tending to work towards, minimum suffering.
The argument might start thus. In areas of nature where there has been 
little human encroachment, animal species ratios have tended to change a 
good deal less than in areas where humans have encroached. As a result of 
human encroachment more species extinctions, area extinctions, or at least 
depletions have occured, and all of these things will tend to have knock-on 
effects on species which used to feed on, or be population controlled by, 
depleted species.
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Knock-on effects may include the following. A great deal of suffering
may occur, in the form of widespread starvation. Predators of depleted prey
species may starve, and prey of depleted predator species may overpopulate, 
exhaust their food supply, then starve. Humans may eventually starve if 
they are potentially in competition for a food supply which is more prone 
to exhaustion. Attempts at relief of present natural suffering might
similarly cause increased starvation, particularly if they take the form of
somehow isolating animals from the cause of their otherwise impending 
suffering. Such isolation might help some animals now, but not necessarily 
later, and "no animal is an island" - removal from predator or prey might 
affect that animal too, or its species - very badly.
An initial response could point out that natural suffering relief could 
instead take the form of something more ecologically "sound" - such as
simply replacing natural population control (predation, starvation, etc) by 
an artificial but less painful method, via the tranquiliser dart gun. Just 
doing the same Job, to the same ends, but by improved means. Also, it could 
be pointed out that even ecologically "unsound" natural suffering relief 
could avoid increased suffering in the long term, if this suffering relief 
was so patchy, or carried out at such a trickle of a rate, that
expectations of worse repercussions would be unrealistic. Even this patchy 
suffering relief would be better than nothing - it would, after all,
relieve some suffering. Can even this small consequence be "trumped" by
some factor that might need to outweigh it?
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Three objections might be made even to natural suffering.relief that is 
ecologically "sound", or natural suffering relief that is so small-scale it 
is unlikely to have worse ecological repercussions. One objection might run 
along similar lines to what Peter Singer has said:
... Judging by our past record, any attempt to change ecological 
systems ... is going to do far more harm than good. (3)
A second objection would ignore past empirical indicators to our possible 
suffering relief performance. It would say simply that in principle human 
performance is fallible. Even in doing something supposedly limited or 
contained we might in fact be doing more harm than we realise. A third 
objection might say that even if the initial results of natural suffering 
relief are favourable, in a sense a bad ex&taple will have been set. 
Successful practitioners of natural suffering relief may create the 
impression that there are no problems attached to the activity, from whence 
potentially less successful practitioners might be encouraged to try their 
luck. Or "too many cooks might spoil the broth" - what at first may seem a 
small band of suffering-relievers might grow to a vast army of humans 
stomping over nature in their hobnail boots.
Opponents of natural suffering relief needn't be committed to anything 
like the view that nature is good, or near-suffering-free. Indeed, nature 
may represent for them only a barely acceptable outcome; a very low stake. 
Other, suffering-reduced permutations may look like better outcomes.
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However, the quest for them Is seen as too risky. Similar caution can 
obtain in other contexts. Take, for example, the idea in international 
relations that it is wise to punish aggressors. It may often be the case 
that "punishing an aggressor" might bring about appalling suffering. 
Punishing Argentina for invading the Falklands involved death, maiming or 
bereavement for hundreds of people. But allowing a world in which 
aggressors might thrive is widely considered too risky. So the one vital 
consequence here is the preservation of the rule of some sense of 
"international law". Again it may represent a minimum outcome - arguably, 
better outcomes might have obtained. We could have accepted the loss of the 
Falklands, financially compensating or requesting evacuation of the 
islanders to save lives and suffering. The way to stop future aggressors 
might simply have been to deter them with troops on the ground where 
threats existed - e.g. by keeping adequate forces in Belize to deter the 
Guatemalans. Failure to do something similar in the Falklands arguably 
precipitated the Argentine invasion.
Opponents of natural suffering relief needn't confine themselves to the 
use of negative maxims like "don't tamper with natural suffering", "don't 
upset the ecosystem", etc. There may be some "do's" as well. Though past 
tampering with natural suffering is a fait accompli, opponents of natural 
suffering relief may favour some nature-tampering of their own, designed to 
rectify the effects of past tampering which they regard as negative. 
Sometimes, for example, predators are reintroduced into areas where they 
have boon made extinct. The British Wolf Society thinks wolves would be
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good for controlling deer in the Scottish Highlands, and thinks wolf 
réintroduction there is well worth investigating. (4)
Réintroductions of species are a particularly interesting case for 
discussion. With threatened extinctions we are always debating about 
hypothetical developments. Where réintroductions are proposed we can and 
are motivated to look properly at actual situations and requirements - for 
example, the law courts may have to decide whether wolf réintroduction is 
legal in the Yellowstone National Park, so reintroducers will be motivated 
to make out a very thorough case. (5) If reintroducers claim that a vital 
ecological function would be served by réintroduction, then opponents of 
réintroduction see its prevention as important too. Their incomes might be 
affected, for example if they are farmers. Even wolf reintroducers admit 
that one wolf can kill well over a hundred farm animals per year in dense 
populations of livestock. <6)
What we see here actually is that the réintroduction case can't be 
anywhere near as well-established as its makers would like it to be - if it 
was well-established, then executive powers would be under pressure to take 
action as a matter of some urgency. Even in Scotland where it is claimed 
wolves would be good for controlling deer, presumably someone has been 
doing this job since the wolf disappeared, many years ago! If marksmen have 
been doing it, deer can regard this method as better than the wolf's!
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. The fact that réintroductions are hotly contested and controversial, 
rather than obvious matters of urgency, leads us to be suspicious of claims 
that currently disappearing species might be irreplaceable. But 
irreplaceable in what sense? Even if an ecosystem could function after a 
species extinction, suffering could increase with the advent of the 
extinction in question - because, according to the argument we are 
considering, the ecosystem before our interference has been "programmed", 
we might say, so as to minimise suffering. In engineering and allowing 
extinctions, humans would be mucking up the "sufferlng-minimisatlon" 
programme. Or just might be mucking up the programme - remember, slight 
risk is bad enough, for the argument now under consideration. We might not 
need to look far in the future for evidence of negative effect. We might, 
for example, make a commonsense guess that a prey animal "deprived" of its 
predator would instead probably die of starvation simply because, without 
the predator's cull, it would probably grow old, feeble, and unable to 
forage for food. No wild animals spend their old age in care homes with 
food provided, even if they are "lucky" enough to live to their old age! So 
predation may in some cases constitute suffering relief from starvation - 
at least death from predation tends to be quicker than death from 
starvation. There is the issue of how much the Increased span of the prey 
animal's life counts for. But it. will be seen that letting predators die 
out is not a simple recipe for suffering relief. (A predator may also be 
another predator's prey - so more starvation, etc, etc.) But just how far 
can the line be held against neglect of, or tampering with, nature?
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There springs to mind straight away at least one context In which to 
look for examples of nature-meddling where net suffering relief has taken 
place. Though far from all livestock farming is humane, there must surely 
be very many cases of thoughtful and responsible farmers giving their 
animals a life more long and peaceful than it would have been for the 
animals' ancestors. Slaughter too, vdien it comes, can accord with humane 
Standards - there has for a while now been a Humane Slaughter Association 
in Britain, which we can presume has had some adherents and even made some 
converts among farmers. Now, if grazing farm animals are in some parts of 
the globe still subject to the attentions of natural predators, can a 
suffering relief ethic Justify "rescuing" these predators if they are 
"endangered"? Some prey populations may already be under humane human 
control, if they are cattle or sheep for example. It then depends whether 
other wild animals may be affected by predator loss, and how. But there is 
no reason to be dogmatically opposed to, say, predator loss. This extreme 
conservatism is hard to justify.
Extreme conservatism is manifested by objections even to ecologically 
"sound", or very limited, natural suffering relief. These objections, put 
simply, are that we have a poor record of intervention in nature so far, we 
are in principle fallible, and even "good" interventions might encourage 
bad ones. Simple replies to these objections are available. The first 
doctors had a poor record of intervention in disease, but routine 
bloodletting has long since been superseded by more successful medical 
techniques. Yes we are still fallible, but we don't let this atop us daily
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at least slightly risking that which is mpst important to us - we cross 
busy roads full of fallible drivers, thereby slightly risking our lives. 
Finally, yes, mass botched participation, in natural suffering relief would 
ruin a good cause, much as mass tourism ruins the case for access to areas 
of natural beauty. But we could attempt legislation to .prevent such 
ruination, if it threatened. .We licence gun owners now. We could licence, 
tranquiliser dart gun owners.
Another point concerns the idea that the existing ecosystem is like a 
"suffering-minimisation" programme where natural suffering is concerned. 
Actually, what. is being "minimised" here is not possible suffering - 
remember, "suffering-reduced" permutations have been rejected as too risky. 
What Is being "minimised", if anything, is the suffering regarded as 
affordable. But since it has been decided that D& attempt at improvement on 
the status quo is affordable, what we have here is quite extraordinary 
defeatism.
We can look to at least three philosophers to provide us with very 
strong reasons to reject such defeatism. First, Singer, who tends to supply 
ammunition for both sides in our debate. Here, we can transfer to a natural 
suffering context something he said on the issue of private, as opposed to 
government, aid to poor countries:
... unless there is a definite probability that by refusing to give 
we would be helping to bring about an increase in government
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assistance, refusing to give privately is ... refusal to prevent a 
definite evil for the sake of a very uncertain gain. (7)
Unless there is a probability that leaving nature alone minimises 
suffering, refusing to relieve natural suffering is bad. It is a refusal to 
prevent a definite evil for the sake of a very uncertain gain - that the 
status quo might represent a "gain" from a hypothetical botched suffering 
relief operation. Suffering relief now may need to be followed by later 
adjustment to the ecosystem. But there may be cases in which we are highly 
motivated to make adjustment, including cases of commercial viability. (8)
Steve Sapontzis gave us two more reasons to reject ecological "holism", 
by which is meant the view that favours keeping the whole ecosystem intact. 
First, he invited us to compare holism to something very murky in the past:
We have already seen what happens when the individual is considered 
to be nothing more than material at the disposal of a Volk or Party; 
there is no reason to believe that the results would be any more 
acceptable if the value of individuals was totally at the disposal 
of ... balances preferred by ecologists ... (9)
The negative value of an individual animal's suffering is, for the holist, 
disposable, if, by such suffering, balances preferred by ecologists are 
achieved. Sapontzis also objected to valuing individuals according to their 
function in the ecosystem, because functional values, he said.
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... are not intrinsically tied to making the world a better place. (10)
' i ■ ' ' L
As we have seen, holism is an extraordinarily conservative philosophy.
Finally, I turn to Eugene Hargrove. Hargrove referred us to a holistic 
philosophy put forward by Barry Commoner that -
... any major man-made change in a natural system is likely to be 
detrimental,to that system. (11)
Hargrove called this philosophy "Therapeutic Nihilism", a term frequently 
used by the Viennese medical community in the nineteenth century. In 
medicine Therapeutic Nihilism encouraged neglect of patients and 
indifference to human life. Its purpose was to enable analysis and 
diagnosis of illness rather than concentrate on early treatment. Since even 
painkillers were apt to distort symptoms, use of painkillers had been 
virtually abandoned, in the Vienna General Hospital by 1850. The medical 
profession's view of treatment as being likely to be counter-productive was 
fuelled by the childbed fever problem in the 1840s. The infant mortality 
rate was Inversely proportional to the degree of medical attention given.
In fact the childbed fever problem was caused by doctors not 
disinfecting their hands after dissecting cadavers, though this explanation 
was not accepted until many years later. The principle of Therapeutic 
Nihilism generally tends to benefit future patients at the expense of
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current ones. It can lead to greater "efficiency" in the long term, but 
ethically is of course highly questionable.
Commoner defended "Therapeutic Nihilism" in environmental contexts by 
likening man-made change in nature to random thrusts into the works of a 
wristwatch, and saying that in both cases continued functioning of the 
system is endangered. Hargrove criticised Commoner by saying that unlike a 
watch nature is unlikely to break down - instead it will change, e.g. 
coyotes will replace wolves, and there will be benefits for some and costs 
for others. Also, we don't have to make random thrusts into the watch - 
skilled pokes by a watch repairer will be less dangerous and might achieve 
an improvement. Environmental Therapeutic Nihilism, for Hargrove,
. . . has contributed to a peculiar kind of callousness toward wild 
animals. Just as the seeming inability to help patients in the 
nineteenth century hardened most doctors and encouraged neglect and 
indifference to human life and suffering, our seeming inability to 
manipulate ecosystems beneficially appears to have fostered a 
similar indifference to the suffering of animal life in natural 
settings. The perpetuation of such an attitude ... runs counter to 
our basic moral sentiments ... (12)
The new point that emerges here is that, unlike the wristwatch, the 
ecosystem may not be a system, in a very important sense. Unlike the watch, 
the ecosystem doesn't simply repeat itself, though of course it has many
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repetitious characteristics: tides, seasons, bird migrations, animal
hibernations etc. Despite these repetitious characteristics, though, nature 
isn’t allays, going round in circles, like the hands of a watch. It doesn't, 
or at least it doesn't so obviously, operate according to a plan. It's not 
even like a guided missile, going somewhere definite. It's more like a 
mysterious river, meandering round obstacles to end up we know not quite 
where. Possibly one day we might get a clearer idea. But we may never do 
so. Why then assume that this apparently aimless and amoral beast, nature, 
in fact knows best about what level of suffering is affordable, or about 
any other moral issue? Why give nature a blank cheque for suffering 
infliction?
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Part 2, Section 3
THE THING TO DO IN UTOPIA?
So far, the objections to natural suffering relief that have been 
encountered have been found wanting. But a stronger objection can be 
anticipated. It would say simply that natural suffering relief time and 
energy would be better spent trying to relieve suffering in the human 
realm. Even a utilitarian observer with a sort of God's eye view, impartial 
between species, would be hard put to deny top priority to human realm 
suffering relief, simply for the reason that it would be a better 
investment of resources. We can help humans help themselves to avoid future 
suffering. We can't do this with animals. But then it would seem, in 
principle, that one day we might have helped ourselves to avoid human realm 
suffering to such an extent that we have plenty of time and energy left 
over for natural suffering relief. (1) Both to simplify matters, and to 
cover even the furthest eventuality, let's assume we have even reached 
Utopia in the human realm. So no human realm suffering relief now competes 
with natural suffering relief. I put a new question. Why wouldn't it be a 
good thing to try to relieve as much natural suffering as possible? Why 
wouldn't natural suffering relief be the thing to do in Utopia? After some 
necessary preliminary comment, this section investigates several answers 
that might be made to my new question.
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In Part 1, we saw that Roslind Godlovltch (2) raised a supposed 
absurdity connected with natural suffering relief by death. She said that 
if we are interested in the suffering but not the lives of animals in 
general, extermination of all animal life is indicated, for all animals 
suffer at one time or another. In the human realm, negative utilitarianism 
certainly invites immediate ridicule, because although we negatively value 
human suffering, we also positively value human lives. But let's, at least 
momentarily, suspend our ridicule for negative utilitarianism as applied to 
nature. After all, it might appear that, unlike humans, animals live only 
in order to live. It might appear that there is no intrinsic point to their 
lives. What then would be the point of continuously relieving natural 
suffering? Why not Just have a one-off mass painless killing of all 
animals?
Animals do live in order to live, that is, they are programmed to be 
always on the look-out for food, shelter, protection, camouflage and 
opportunities for reproduction. Even in an environment where they had 
little time in which they could safely drop their guard and relax, animals 
wouldn't see their lives as unsatisfactory in quite the way humans might, 
if basic needs were met but there seemed nothing to live for for its own 
sake. So in an important sense animals aren't bothered about not having 
anything to live for, apart from life itself. They don't "set out" to live 
for other things, as it were. But they might discover them, if their 
environment relents for a moment. For example, animals which have fed, 
caught up on their sleep, and which don't face immediate threats, tend to
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discover the pleasures of play, or perhaps grooming each other. Given 
future opportunities, they will repeat these things, and these things will 
be done for their own sakes, not in order to live. For animals, discovered 
pleasures are intrinsically worthwhile. So, prima facie, it appears that in 
Utopia it would be a worthwhile thing to relieve natural suffering without 
at the same time prematurely ending natural lives. So let's, for the sake 
of argument, suggest the task in hand for any would-be natural suffering 
relievers. It is to anaesthetise animals' otherwise impending painful 
"natural" deaths by predation, starvation or disease. There springs to mind 
the rather comic image of armies of humans with tranquiliser dart guns, in
jeeps, chasing round. Keystone Cops style, trying to tranqullise gazelles,
etc, just before the cheetahs get them. But my question isn't, wouldn't 
this be comic? My question is, wouldn't this be moral? Why wouldn't it be 
moral? And the more of it happening, the more moral?
So, in Utopia, why wouldn't it be a good thing to try to relieve as
much natural suffering as possible? Below I suggest some answers:
1. "Because the suffering relief workload would be unreasonably demanding. "
2. "Because the workload would be too demanding to be workable. "
3. "Because, irrespective of whether they could cope with the workload, 
biiwaps. might not be left enough time for Intrinsically worthwhile 
pursuits. "
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Of course, discussions about the demandingness of suffering relief needn't 
be, and haven't been, confined to, or indeed at all about, the context of 
natural suffering relief. Discussions on the issue of human positive goods 
versus suffering relief needn't be, and haven't been, confined to, or 
indeed at all about, the context of natural suffering relief. But here, 
obviously, the discussions are confined to the context of natural suffering 
relief. , ’ *
1. "Optimal natural suffering relief would be unreasonablv demanding."
Before we go any further, two relevant factors need to be investigated. 
First, the size of the natural suffering relief workload. Second, the size 
of the suffering relief workforce. About the first factor, probably we can 
only speculate and hypothesize. Millions of small birds, rodents, etc, let 
alone the more visible animal species, will still be suffering, unless they 
become extinct before we get to Utopia, It is very doubtful whether the 
human race could, even "on paper", cover the amount of suffering relief 
involved. So, in the absence of any firm projections, let's list the 
possible scenarios:
1. The amount of suffering relief can't be covered, even "on paper". 
Suppose it's not even possible for us to breed new suffering relievers, 
because the environment won't sustain them!
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2. The amount of suffering relief can just be covered, but only with 
universal human participation in natural suffering relief. Again, suppose 
the environment won't sustain the breeding of new suffering relievers, so 
we can't lighten the workload.
3. The amount of suffering relief can be more than covered. With universal 
human participation in natural suffering relief, everyone would be left 
with a significant amount of time and energy left over. Perhaps species 
extinctions have after all taken their toll.
Next, we need to consider the relative size of the participating
suffering relief workforce. We could make enough exact projections here to 
make my discussion interminable. But perhaps it will emerge that only the
difference between two particular projections, the second one vague, is
philosophically interesting:
1. In a scenario comparable to <3) above, everyone does participate in 
natural suffering relief.
ii. In a scenario comparable to (3) above, enough people absent themselves 
from natural suffering relief to ensure that other people have a workload 
big enough to keep them at full stretch.
So, back to the point at issue. Under scenario (3), on projection (1), 
natural suffering relief would leave everyone with a significant amount of
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spare time.andienergy. In this situation, people would be least inclined to 
disagree that it would be a good thing to try to relieve as much natural 
suffering as possible. . But under scenarios (1) and (2), and scenario (3) on 
projection (ii), doing as much natural suffering relief as possible would 
mean that people would have a suffering relief workload big enough to keep 
them at• .full!.stretch. (3) In this situation, people would be much more 
inclined to say "optimal natural suffering relief would-be too demanding to 
be reasonable". Would this be fair comment?
The complaint here is not that optimal natural suffering relief would 
prevent people from doing something else worthwhile. Even if people wanted 
time left over Just to twiddle their thumbs, the complaint would stand. 
People would say, simply, "optimal natural suffering relief would* be too* 
demanding to be reasonable". And if optimal natural suffering relief 
threatened to put people at full stretch, the above statement would meet 
with wide, perhaps near universal, agreement. The extent of this agreement 
would, for some, in itself justify use of the term "unreasonable" to 
describe optimal natural suffering relief. If a thing is so much out of 
tune with our near universal inclinations or intuitions, this in itself 
would be held sufficient a reason to fail the thing in question* under the 
"reasonability" test. Optimal natural suffering relief would be held to be 
too demanding to pass the test. But we might be well advised to dwell a 
little on the seemingly straightforward question of whom optimal natural 
suffering relief might be too demanding for.
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Obviously, optimal natural suffering relief would be held to be too 
demanding for us.. But whom does this leave out? Of course, the animals.
Since they would be the intended beneficiaries of optimal natural suffering 
relief, it would be absurd to say it would be too demanding for them. But 
suppose, then, that we desist from optimal natural suffering relief on the 
grounds that it would be too demanding for us. What then happens to the 
animals? Of course, the lees natural suffering relief we do, the more they 
have to run the gauntlet of natural suffering. We're happy - the situation
isn't demanding for us. But why not look at it this way - mightn't our
falling short from an optimal natural suffering relief effort be more 
demanding for animals than an optimal effort would be demanding for humans?
If we made an optimal natural suffering relief effort (at least, under 
conditions of the relevant scenarios earlier described) we would be in
danger of suffering from things like physical exhaustion, mental 
frustration and lack of fulfilment, perhaps severe injury if something went 
wrong, perhaps suicidal thoughts if we were sufficiently frustrated but 
felt unable to "conscientiously object". But if we fell short from an
optimal natural suffering relief effort? The further we fell short, the
more animals would suffer from things like being eaten alive, starving to 
death, dying slowly and painfully from untreated disease, etc. The worst 
that might result from the things on the humans' list would probably be
suicide. But. .at least that could be ,quick, if it . happened. We wouldn't
seriously want for ourselves any of the things on the animals' list. So the 
worst demandingncGc would lie elsewhere from where we think.
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Suppose two alien species arrive to colonise Earth, both species at 
least as far ahead of us technologically as we are far ahead of animals.
Further, the first alien species is as far ahead of the second as the
second is far ahead of us. The second species has a nasty habit of eating
humans alive, and we have difficulty resisting this. But we can see that
the first alien species has the technology, and at least some inclination, 
at least to tranqullise us before we get eaten alive. But we hear one 
member of the first species saying to the other members, "don't tranquilise
more than a certain amount of humans - to tranquilise more of them would be
too demanding". We would want to object that not to tranquilise more of us 
would be more demanding for us than to tranquilise more of us would be
demanding for the first alien species. We wouldn't want the first alien
species to hide behind the sham objectivity of "too demandingness" here. 
But this sham objectivity extends too to the claim "optimal natural 
suffering relief would be too demanding to be reasonable”. We would be on 
surer ground if we confined ourselves to the claim "optimal natural 
suffering relief would be too demanding to be workable". (4)
2. "Optimal natural suffering relief would be too demanding to be workable"
Here, once again, an exception may be made under conditions of my 
earlier scenario (3), on projection (1), where the natural suffering relief 
workload would be small enough, and the participating suffering relief 
workforce huge enough, to render optimal natural suffering relief workable.
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However, In the cases where optimal natural suffering relief would threaten 
to put people at full stretch, people would be inclined to say that it
would be too demanding to be workable. In other words, that people Just
wouldn't put up with the heaviness of the workload, or perhaps, anything 
like this heaviness.
It may be said that the question at issue is not whether optimal 
natural suffering relief would work, but whether it would be a good thing 
if it did work, or perhaps, whether it would be a good thing to try to make
it work. And so far, we haven't encountered an objection to natural
suffering relief, even to optimal natural suffering relief (in Utopia), 
which hasn't been found wanting, or which hasn't applied only contingently. 
So it might appear that at least to attempt optimal natural suffering 
relief, at least in Utopia where the contingencies are favourable, would be 
a good thing. How could such an attempt not be a good thing?
There are two answers, perhaps. First, an attempt at optimal natural 
suffering relief wouldn't be a good thing if the unworkability of the 
attempt threatened to become so acute as to make the attempt self- 
defeating. Imagine, for example, that suffering relievers might feel like 
moral conscripts, and, like Russian conscripts in Chechenia, their 
unwillingness might cause them to be so incompetent that their masters 
would wish they'd never been sent in.
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Second, acceptance that optimal natural suffering relief is a good 
thing might eventually turn so sour as to undermine the idea even of sub- 
optimal human realm suffering relief, were this suffering relief ever to be 
needed again. Eventually, people might come to see the demandingness of 
optimal natural suffering relief as a kind of hell. (5) Some of them might 
have been born in this hell, but they might see that the descent to hell 
from outside is the slippery slope of suffering relief. They might resolve 
not only to escape hell, but, once out, to avoid the slippery slope of 
suffering relief, rather than ever in future set foot on it.
Even in my earlier scenario where optimal natural suffering relief
would leave people with spare time and energy, people might feel that
future human realm suffering relief would immediately take them to full 
stretch. And with this feeling might come unease, leading to 
disillusionment with the whole idea of suffering relief. And so perhaps, 
eventually, there would be mass desertions from the armies of suffering
relievers. Again, somewhere down the line, future suffering relief efforts
might be made unworkable; undermined by previous efforts having been so
ambitious as to provoke desertions from the poor bloody infantry, and a
resolve on the part of their offspring never in future to join the
suffering relief armies. So the suffering relief generals have a dilemma.
Would it be better not to expect so much from the infantry? Would it be 
better not to try to optimise?
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Any good general has to take into account considerations of the
motivation of his troops, and how to get the best out of them. One fairly 
obvious way that has been tried, in several contexts, has been to treat the 
"troops" equally, at least because we are all so prone to look at what the 
next person is being expected to do, and to resent being expected to do
much more than what the next person is being expected to do. So, up until a
certain point, we may be prepared to take on 9 demanding workload,
suffering relief or otherwise, if everyone else is being expected to take 
on a similar workload. But only up until a certain point. If our individual 
workloads threaten to take us to full stretch, we may not be so easily 
consoled by knowledge that similar levels of performance are being expected 
of other people. (6) So let's suppose that in our case the optimal natural 
suffering relief workload is too big for its equal subdivision to allow 
people not to be at full stretch. Here, would sub-optimal suffering relief 
be more workable than optimal suffering relief, because less demanding? In 
the long term, would sub-optimal suffering relief be sufficiently more 
workable as to end up leading to greater relief of suffering?
It may well be that we can do little more than speculate. But we can 
keep in mind a couple of cautionary principles. First, that, as soon as we 
think we might be able to afford to keep people at less than full stretch, 
it will then almost certainly be counter-productive to treat them unequally 
by expecting some but not all of them, to go to full.. stretch. Unless 
exhaustion threatens, people do tend to work better if they are treated 
equally.
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But, second, even if we think optimal suffering relief might be too 
demanding to be workable, or at any rate to be sufficiently workable for
our purposes, we would be well advised to wonder whether refusal to embark
upon it might be, in Peter Singer's words,
... refusal to prevent a definite evil for the sake of a very
uncertain gain. (7)
It might be very uncertain that sub-optimal suffering relief would prove 
more workable, because less demanding, in the long term. It might be very 
uncertain that sub-optimal suffering relief would prove sufficiently more 
workable as to end up leading to greater relief of suffertng. For t&iat 
level of certainty of future gain would we be prepared not to relieve at 
least some definite natural suffering now (i.e., in Utopia)? We would have 
to decide.
But, in the end, if optimal natural suffering relief now is too 
demanding to be workable, or at any rate to be sufficiently workable for 
our purposes, then this objection won't provide a reason not to employ the 
sub-optimal suffering relief strategy that seems to be the best investment 
of our resources. (8) And if this strategy is the best investment of our 
resources, it will eventually represent optimal suffering relief in 
practice, if not, at first, "on paper".
75
3, "Optimal natural suffering relief mightn't leave us time to be creative"
Near the beginning of this section, I countered the suggestion that it 
might appear there is no intrinsic point to animal lives. I said that
although animals "set out", as it were, to live only in order to live, they
might discover intrinsically worthwhile activities; activities to be 
pursued not in order to live, but for the sakes of the activities
themselves. For example, animals play, or groom each other. Let's call
these activities "creative",. in the sense that they create purposes for 
living creatures over and above the somewhat circular purpose of mere
survival. Of course, we humans have creative activities too, though our 
creative activities tend to spread over a rather wider range. The next
objection to optimal natural suffering relief is this - mightn't such 
suffering relief prevent us humans from being creative with our lives?
Mightn't it prevent us. from having intrinsic point to our lives? Even if we 
had a little time and energy left over from optimal natural suffering 
relief, would it be enough to let us be creative in the above sense?
We could stop here for a moment, and point out that devotion to others, 
including devotion . to animals' suffering relief, might be regarded as 
creative - after all, such devotion might give individuals a purpose over 
and above their own mere survival. But it might be argued in reply that 
optimal devotion to others doesn't properly use the individual's creative 
opportunity - it merely displaces that opportunity to the objects of
devotion. They are now free to be properly creative, if someone is looking
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after their basic needs for them. Or at least, it may be that vHiat they do 
create is not now likely to be counterweighted, because a devoted suffering 
reliever is around to provide protection against any threat of awful 
suffering. But if in turn the objects of devotion displace their own 
creative opportunities by optimal devotion to still others, we are always 
going round in a circle, and no one can create a purpose outside this
circle. We might as well all be devoted to our own mere survival.
Some feminists dislike vAiat they see as the limited aspirations of some
women simply to be good wives and mothers, always devoted to someone else
and never wanting to create in their own right. Could optimal natural 
suffering relievers, or indeed any optimal suffering relievers, justifiably 
be seen as having limited aspirations? But an answer might start that yes, 
of course their aspirations would be limited. But what's our main question? 
Our main question, in effect, is whether optimal suffering relievers' 
aspirations would be moralIv limited. Now, could they be?
It is difficult to see how optimal suffering relievers could have
aspirations that would be morally limited. The only way in which this 
criticism might apply might be in a contrived situation like that 
postulated above, where everyone is optimally devoted to others. Suppose 
that everyone knows that everyone else is optimally devoted to others, so 
everyone can see the circularity of purpose here. Having seen this futile 
circularity, how could people be happy? And if they couldn't be happy, 
wouldn'i optimal devotion to others be morally limited?
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But the thought may occur to us that If optimal devotion to others, or 
optimal devotion to suffering relief, is optimal devotion to animals, or 
optimal devotion to animals' suffering relief, then the above circularity 
of purpose is broken - because animals won't in turn be optimally devoted 
to others! For at least some of their time, they will be properly creative, 
even if their range of creative activities is narrow.
So, in Utopia, suppose optimal natural suffering relief occupies all 
our spare time. Animals' creative activities, like playing with and 
grooming each other, are less likely than ever before to be counterweighted 
by the violent or prolonged deaths from predation or starvation or disease 
that used to be routine. But we now have no time to be creative in our own 
right! This objection to optimal natural suffering relief seems to have 
massive intuitive force. But is the objection as strong as it seems?
Once again, we could use the previous thought experiment in which two 
technologically superior alien species arrive, and we need the first 
species to help us against the second. We'd rather, too, that the first 
species helped us optimally. But we hear one of its members saying to the 
others, "don't help humans to the extent that you have no time to be 
creative". The other members agree, so they fall short of helping us 
optimally. So more of us get eaten alive by members of the second alien 
species, in order that more members of the first alien species get time to 
be creative. Would this be a good thing? It doesn't seem so. But we seem to 
want something siqilar to be the deal where animals are involved.
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Conclusion
We entered this section not having encountered an adequate objection to 
the principle of natural suffering relief. Now it emerges that, at least if 
we posit a situation where human realm suffering no longer exists, it is 
perhaps surprisingly difficult to find an adequate objection to the 
principle of optimal natural suffering relief, though the practice of 
optimal natural suffering relief might present more difficulties.
For us not to optimally relieve natural suffering would be more 
demanding for animals than optimal natural suffering relief would be 
demanding for us. And if we were in animals' places, we would justifiably 
reject the idea that time spent saving us from, say, being eaten alive 
would be better spent on "creative" activities, however creative these 
activities might be, even if we had only a narrow range of creative 
activities to offer in comparison, and even if we couldn't offer any 
reciprocal help to our helpers. We are led to the conclusion that, at least 
with no human realm suffering around, optimal natural suffering relief 
would be a good thing. Why, then, would it" be entirely predictable that 
masses of people would absent themselves from natural suffering relief?. I 
suggest that there would be no good moral reason - the reason would be, 
simply, that we humans are not very moral.
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SSlêS.
1. In the words of Eric Rakowski, the only sound reasons for inaction
Cnow] are contingent ones". See Eric Rakowski, Equal Justine 
(Clarendon, 1991), p. 365.
2. Roslind Godlovltch, "Animals and Morals", in Stanley Godlovitch, 
Roslind Godlovitch, and John Harris (eds). Animals. Men and 
(Gollancz, 1971).
3. Other philosophers may wish to replace my "... scenarios (1) and (2), 
and scenario (3) on projection (ii)" with "full compliance Rule 
Utilitarianism (or Consequentialism) under conditions of exhausting 
suffering relief workloads, and under Act Utilitarianism (or 
Consequent ialism)".
4. Other philosophers may regard the foregoing subsection as a defence of 
both Rule and Act Utilitarianism (or Consequentialism) against a charge 
that, with big enough suffering relief workloads in the case of either, 
both moral codes could prove "too demanding to be reasonable".
5. Though of course, as I pointed out earlier, they wouldn't want instead 
to be eaten alive, starve to death, die slowly and painfully from 
untreated disease, etc.
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6. Rule Utilitarianism (or Consequentialism> in suffering relief contexts,
has the advantage over Act Utilitarianism (or Consequentialism) that, 
with small enough total suffering relief workloads, it is less
demanding on the individual, so likely to be more workable. But the
advantage disappears, of course, if the total suffering relief workload
is big enough.
7. Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge, 1985), p. 179.
8. In fact, the objection will provide a reason to. employ the sub-optimal
suffering relief strategy that seems to be the best investment of our
resources!
Part 3

83
Part 3
"ACCIDENTAL" HUMAN EFFECTS ON NATURAL SUFFERING
Realistically, it doesn't look likely that humans will ever be 
enthusiastic about deliberate, active natural suffering relief. It's hard 
to think even of passive, "laissez-faire" policies where humans have had 
natural suffering relief as a deliberate aim. But if deliberate natural 
suffering relief has been beyond us, "accidental" natural suffering relief 
is another matter. It's certain we've relieved natural suffering by trying 
to engineer or allow something else, and that we've relieved natural 
suffering simply by tolerating something engineered or allowed for another 
purpose. There's a lesson here. Deliberate, active natural suffering relief 
may not be our priority. But, in future, maybe we can at least deliberately 
and systematically encourage or allow human behaviour which accidentally 
relieves natural suffering, where before, perhaps, this behaviour would 
have been encouraged or allowed only contingently or expediently, for 
reasons other than for natural suffering relief. What about human behaviour 
which accidentally raises levels of natural suffering? Maybe we can 
deliberately and systematically discourage or cease to allow the human 
behaviour in question. But first we need to survey all the accidental human 
 ^ effects on natural suffering to see whether, considered separately, they 
can be thought of as good things, leaving aside the question of vÆiether 
better things might replace them. The picture may be more complicated than 
we think.
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Consider the following four accidental human effects on levels of 
natural suffering:
1. "Less suffering, no fewer lives" . . * »
Engineered or allowed depletions, or introductions, of species resulting in 
net loss in suffering, with no net loss in number of lives lived. (1) For 
example, farmers shoot wolves, or declining wolf population is let decline. 
Sheep no longer suffer from wolf predation. Humans kill sheep humanely 
instead, and more sheep get longer lives, produce offspring etc than wolves 
lose lives. Assume effects involving rival predators, prey populations etc 
don't make matters worse, in this classification.
2. "Extra suffering, no extra lives"
Engineered or allowed depletions, or introductions, of species resulting in 
net increase in suffering. No net increase in number of lives lived. For 
example, suppose cheetahs kill flamingos quickly. But then humans shoot 
cheetahs for the commercial value of their skins. Hyenas replace cheetahs 
as flamingo killers. Hyena numbers multiply (fewer starve - no competition 
to eat flamingos) and cancel out loss in cheetah numbers. But hyenas 
cripple flamingos to make them helpless, then often go away and don't kill 
them until a return visit. (2) So flamingo suffering increases.
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3. "Extra suffering, extra lives"
As for (2), except that there is a net increase in number of lives lived. 
Suppose, for example, the amount of flamingo meat needed by the average 
hyena is less than the amount needed by the average cheetah. So more hyena 
lives are enabled than cheetah lives lost. How does "extra lives lived" 
trade off against the extra suffering these extra lives will bring?
4, "Less suffering, fewer lives"
Engineered or allowed depletions, or introductions, of species resulting in 
net loss in suffering. But also a concomitant net loss in number of lives 
lived. For example, reintroduced sparrowhawks kill bluetits quickly, thus 
"saving" the bluetits from starving slowly in winter. But of course, fewer 
bluetits! Perhaps, eventually, not enough bluetits to prevent sparrowhawk 
starvation.
Separate considerations of the four effects now follow.
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1. Leas suffering, no fewer lives
A welcome outcome. There may be some redistribution of suffering, if 
for example wolves suffer instead of sheep. However, if the end result is a 
new, sustainable suffering-reduced pattern with no net loss in animal 
numbers, this will represent an improvement on the previous pattern. But a 
problem might come with the means to the new outcome. There will have been 
no human altruism towards animals at work here. Species distributions will 
have changed because humans had, at least at one point, interests in making 
them change. Does the human-oriented, dubious motivation present a problem?
We encountered dubious motivation in Part 2, Section 1. Holmes Rolston 
(3) suggested that we follow nature, rather than presume to re-organise it. 
Even if our re-organisation appears to bring good consequences, our 
presumption could be dangerous. This presumption, a type of dubious 
motivation, could lead to worse consequences later. And so with all types 
of dubious motivation. Better that things are done, if done at all, with 
good motivation. So do we reject even suffering relief, in case we 
encourage the dubious motivation that might lie behind it? Approve of 
suffering relief only if the suffering relievers are bona fide?
But if dubious motivation does threaten to bring bad consequences in 
the future, then what we can do is resolve to be always on our guard, and 
if possible and necessary take preventive action nearer the time. But we
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can often take advantage of dubious motivation now, if it brings suffering 
relief. Not to take advantage of dubious motivation might be, to repeat 
Peter Singer's words,
... refusal to prevent a definite evil for the sake of a very
uncertain gain. (4)
The "definite evil" here would be suffering now. The "very uncertain gain"
would be the possibility that we might help to encourage good motivation
generally, either to bring good consequences or, for the non­
consequent ialist, because good motivation is an end in itself. But awful 
consequences can follow from obstinate refusals to accept help from ^ hose 
with impure motives. What if the democracies had refused to co-operate with
the Soviet Union against Hitler, on the grounds that the Soviets had no
intention of saving Eastern Europe for democracy? The cost of non-co- 
operation might have been to prolong Hitler's defeat, and to make a third 
world war (between the democracies and the Soviets) more likely. Would this 
cost have been worth it merely for the sake of setting high standards for 
the inclusion of other countries amongst one's allies?
2. Extra suffering, no extra lives
Now things start getting harder. "Less suffering, no fewer lives" was 
welcome. So, symmetrically, "extra suffering, no extra lives" must be bad.
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To bring about this outcome in nature would facilitate natural suffering. 
Where then lies the problem? Can't we look at the cheetah and hyena example 
given earlier and disapprove of human hunting of cheetahs, if this entails 
the spread of the hyenas' particularly awful predation habits? We can. But 
the human race doesn't have much to lose here, all things considered. Much 
more problematic examples abound.
Suppose that whenever we build a road, we threaten a substantial 
depletion in the number of foxes. (They will be hit by cars. ) So there will 
be fewer foxes to prey on rodents. Which predator takes over? Say it's the 
hawk, which is unlikely to be hit by cars, and which gives rodents slower 
deaths. In building a new road, we have "accidentally" facilitated natural 
suffering. Are we going to have to consult zoologists about every new road 
proposal?
"Don't facilitate natural suffering" wouldn't be such a conservative 
maxim as "don't tamper with nature". With the latter maxim it seems humans 
can never build anew or develop, lest we encroach further upon nature. With 
"don't facilitate natural suffering", further human development could be 
approved if it doesn't facilitate natural suffering, or brings net natural 
suffering relief. However, it will be asked, do we seriously even have to 
find out vAiat the natural suffering permutations might be, every time we do 
things for our own purposes? The assumption behind this question is that 
side-effects on animals are of very negligible importance.
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Of course, arguments can be put that building new roads, etc will 
facilitate human suffering, in the form of serious road accident 
casualties, for example. But suppose we're discussing proposed new housing, 
which could still threaten a few foxes with destruction under the wheels of 
dump trucks. The new housing could be luxury flats, so no suffering relief 
for the homeless would be involved. Here we have a case of proposed 
building, not for human suffering relief, but neither would it cause human 
suffering. (Objectors could say the builders' money could have been used 
for human suffering relief, but let's assume this would be economically 
counter-productive.) It will be asked, is it seriously suggested that 
increased natural suffering would be of sufficient moral importance for us 
to veto something (i.e. building luxury flats) that would make at least 
some humans more contented?
Confronted by powerful challenging intuitions, we might be inclined to 
an urgent review of all our options. They are:
1. Back off. Take the view that some happiness promotion (that of humans) 
morally outweighs some suffering relief (natural suffering relief).
2. Stick to our guns. Be some way as conservative and cautious in attitude 
to development, industrialisation, etc as was an extreme ascetic such as 
Mahatma Gandhi, if for rather different reasons.
90
3. Hold that while natural suffering relief is morally important, humans 
are morally underdeveloped, and the best we can hope for is that humans 
will support natural suffering relief which doesn't seriously threaten 
their own projects, - . .
Option (3) has a precedent. Singer took an analogous position on Third 
World suffering relief. (5) Option (2) is honourable. Option (1) won't do, 
for conscientious believers in a suffering relief ethic.
For a suffering relief ethic, the promotion of happiness isn't morally 
symmetrical with suffering relief. No increased happiness can counterweight 
extreme suffering; say, from torture, being eaten alive, starving to death, 
dying slowly and painfully from untreated disease, etc. And not just human; 
or human-inflicted, suffering is morally important. If suffering is 
important, sufferers are important. Animals suffer. They can suffer at our 
hands, but they suffer naturally too. If we are concerned (at least a
little) about suffering laboratory rodents, why not be concerned too (at 
least a little) about naturally suffering rodents? At least sufficiently
not to allow their increased natural suffering, if we can stop this simply 
by going without something we don't really need anyway. For example, we 
could go without new luxury flats, if, say, we have old ones already, and
construction of new flats would destroy quick killers of rodents and
facilitate slow killers. Greater self-denial might indeed Involve an 
austerity comparable to that of Mahatma Gandhi, but while this would be 
eccentric, how are we to rate it morally? Quite highly, it seems to me.
91
But perhaps we have to accept that the little humans do care about, 
say, rodents, might extend to undisputed examples of their suffering, such 
as in laboratories, but probably won't extend to cases where we might have 
to consult zoologists before knowing precisely how patterns of natural 
suffering might be changed by, say, development, or industrialisation.
3. Extra suff^ rjLhs>— Qxtrg. 1.1%^
The "less suffering, no fewer lives" outcome, discussed first, we saw 
might be sustainable, rather than just temporary. This might be because 
humans have an interest in keeping the numbers of a species stable at a 
certain level. The animals in question might, for example, be farm animals. 
The "extra suffering, no extra lives" outcome, discussed second, might be 
sustainable too. For example, new predators, bringing slower deaths than 
their predecessors, might, nevertheless, neatly fill the hole in the 
ecosystem left by human elimination of the old predators. But what if the 
new predators overfill the hole in the ecosystem? The new predators might 
need less prey meat per predator than the old predators did. Thus, the same 
number of prey animals, now suffering slower deaths, might provide meat for 
an increased number of predators. If so, we would have our third outcome, 
"extra suffering, extra lives".
Will the "extra suffering, extra lives" outcome be sustainable? In the 
above example the new predators' numbers might level off. Their numbers
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might slightly overfill the hole in the ecosystem. But the numbers might be
sustainable. : But there may be other examples of "extra suffering, extra
lives" vrtiich. may not be sustainable. This is because, with "extra lives" 
comes: the question of whether the environment can sustain these extra
lives. If there are too many extra lives, the environment may not be able 
to support them. A case in point might be a situation in which a predator 
species had been depleted by human activity, but not been adequately
replaced in the ecosystem. As a result, the prey animal population might 
grow so big that it would overgraze its habitat and exhaust its own food 
supply. After that a population crash would follow. "Extra lives" in the 
last example would apply for as long as the increased numbers of prey 
animals still totalled more than the numbers of lost predators. "Extra 
suffering" might be a concomitant effect for as long as increased numbers 
of animals were also suffering, before their deaths, from starvation. So 
here might be a temporary "extra suffering, extra lives" outcome. After a 
time, large numbers of starvation deaths, and fewer births, might lead to 
the final natural suffering outcome still to be discussed: "less suffering, 
fewer lives". "Less suffering" from now on, because fewer sufferers. -
The upshot of the above discussion is that we might usefully consider 
the "extra suffering, extra lives" outcome under the heading of the "less 
suffering, fewer lives" outcome. Because "extra suffering, extra lives" in 
practice might lead to "less suffering, fewer lives". But if the 
environment can sustain "extra lives"? Then the value (if such it is) of 
"extra lives" still might have a theoretical symmetry with the disvalue (if
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such it is) of "fewer lives". We might derive the value or disvalue of 
"extra suffering, extra lives" from knowing the disvalue or value of "less 
suffering, fewer lives". So let's move on.
4. Less suffering, fewer lives
This outcome doesn't only result from unsustainable prey animal 
population explosions. It's also an accompanying feature of what we might 
call "top-heaviness", as opposed to (temporary) "hot tom-heaviness" in 
nature. "Top-heaviness" is when there are too many predators per population 
of prey animals. The prey animal numbers might have been depleted by human 
hunting. So already, "fewer lives"; and perhaps already "less suffering" 
too, if the prey animals died less painfully than they otherwise would have 
done, and such a decrease in suffering outweighed the increase in suffering 
due to predator starvation. But by the time large numbers of predators have 
starved, the outcome for the future in nature will certainly be "less 
suffering, fewer lives".
Human activity can also bring about "less suffering,' fewer lives" in 
nature simply by destroying entire animal habitats. So fewer habitats to 
sustain future animal lives and future animal suffering. It is thought that 
the destruction of hedgerows by intensive modern farming has caused the 
decline in numbers of songbirds in Britain. But at least there will be 
fewer songbirds to routinely suffer from starvation in winter. (6)
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Provisionally, let's be neutral as to whether "less suffering, fewer 
lives" in nature is good or bad. We see again that if human pursuits have 
side-effects on natural suffering, a problem might await, whether we deem 
side-effects good or bad. If the natural suffering outcome is good, we face 
the dubious motivation problem. Do we accept the natural suffering outcome, 
if it arises from human action dubiously motivated? For at the very least, 
the action won't have constituted human altruism towards animals. I 
responded to the dubious motivation problem earlier.
If the natural suffering outcome is bad, we might face the problem of 
whether to curtail activities which after all benefit humans. I suggested 
earlier that we may have to let some activities proceed. But we would here 
be regarding humans as morally underdeveloped, at least where natural 
suffering is concerned.
Earlier I compared one option - opposition to any facilitation of 
natural suffering - to the extreme asceticism of a figure like Gandhi. But 
I said some way as conservative towards development, etc, as the likes of 
Gandhi. Because some natural suffering side-effects of human development 
might be good ones. Here the human activities in question should be 
welcomed. They might include the spread of humane sheep farming. Now, if 
"less suffering, fewer lives" in nature is to be regarded as good, we see 
very clearly a parting of the ways with Gandhi. It would be good to proceed 
apace with intensive modern farming, if it brings "less suffering, fewer 
lives" in nature.
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Are we going to declare in favour of "less suffering, fewer lives" in 
nature? If so, we will face both ridicule, and implacable hostility from 
those who will find our position morally repugnant.
In Part 1, we saw that Roslind Godlovitch (7) showed that any amount of 
natural suffering would lead us to value animals' lives negatively, unless 
we give the lives at least some positive value for some reason. This would 
be negative utilitarianism as applied to nature. Without positive value, 
animals' painless deaths, say from marksmen's bullets, would have to be 
regarded as a good thing.
If we favour "less suffering, fewer lives" in nature, we will have a 
"genocide problem" of our own. Animals' pleasures, considered apart from 
their suffering, would still fall under the heading "good consequences". 
But the problem is, nobody is interested in sifting out animals' pleasures 
from animals' suffering. So we have to decide whether animals' pleasures 
are worth animals' suffering. If the answer is generally negative, then 
"less suffering, fewer lives" outcomes from human effect on nature will 
tend to meet with our approval. "Painless" genocide in nature would 
certainly suggest itself as a possible remedy for cases of animals' 
suffering not outweighed by animals' pleasures.
Perhaps "painless" genocide in nature is pretty unlikely. But now 
things get worse. What if genocide in nature were to be not painless, just 
less painful than what otherwise would have happened to animals, considered
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collectively? Would there be examples in history of what we might call net 
natural suffering relief genocide? For example, how are we to regard the 
cowboys* extermination of sixty million buffaloes over a ten year period in 
the mid-nineteenth century American West? (Of course, this example, and
others, will be complicated by connected effects on humans. The American 
Indians' suffered catastrophically from the loss of the buffaloes, which had 
been central to their way of life.)
It seems that a suffering relief ethic might feature a bizarre
combination of responses to accidental human effect on nature. On the one
hand, Gandhi-type austerity, in response to human activities where we might 
benefit at natural suffering expense. On the other hand, approval, 
possibly, where entire species are wiped out, or animal habitats (say, 
rainforests) systematically destroyed, taking natural suffering with them.
And put accidental human effect on nature on one side, briefly. Now 
imagine a man who couldn't persuade other people to anaesthetise natural 
suffering. This man gets sleepless nights, kept awake by thinking about 
unalleviated natural suffering. He could himself do some anaesthetising, in 
his spare time. But his efforts would be a drop in the ocean, and wouldn't 
outlast his own lifetime. Is there any significant or lasting natural 
suffering relief he can bring about, even if it's putting animals "out of 
their misery"? There is! He happens to be the captain of a nuclear
submarine. He could blow up a whole offshore island full of naturally 
suffering seabirds. The Island would sink, and never again support natural
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suffering. No humans live on the island. Of course, a court martial would 
follow. But shouldn't the captain's act go down in history as a heroic 
example of deliberate natural suffering relief?
Simply by showing the apparently ridiculous questions, bizarre 
Juxtapositions, and above all unthinkable thoughts connected with the above 
position, I have already sketched what seems to be an Utterly damning 
prosecution case against it. Is there anything to be said for the defence?
We could usefully start with the thought that, in terms of natural 
suffering, animals' lives are very far from equal. At one end of the 
spectrum there are animals which, because they are huge (e.g. elephants), 
or inaccessible (e.g. they live in trees). Just don't suffer much from 
predation. Also, some of these animals, particularly if they are big or 
don't get attacked, may live for decades, this without being nearly so 
prone to natural suffering as some other animals are.
At the other end of the spectrum there are animals whose natural 
suffering statistics are truly horrendous, even if we compare them with 
human suffering statistics in the Third World. Lion cubs die mostly from 
starvation: the mortality rate is eighty percent. (8) Cheetah cub mortality 
is ninety-five percent. (9) Average robins live one tenth of their 
potential lifespans, (8) For animals at the worse end of the natural 
suffering spectrum, life is well described by Eugene Hargrove:
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... individual wild animals ... may be killed or eaten at almost 
any time. The only way to be reasonably sure that any particular •' 
animals will have an opportunity to live out a full lifespan is to < 
remove them from their natural habitat and place them in an 
artificial environment - such as a zoo or park - where they are 
safe from predation and various other hazards. (10)
So there are animals which are particularly prone to natural suffering, 
and there are animals which are better able to resist, avoid or postpone
natural suffering, maybe for decades. Would eventual starvation suffering,
after a long suffering-free life, make this sort of life not worth living? 
If this sort of life looks, prima facie, worth living, then here perhaps is 
the thin end of a wedge. How many suffering-free years would qualify an 
animal for a life worth living? Where would be the cut-off point? What 
possible reason could be given for preferring one cut-off point to another 
point very nearby?
The problem of how to agree precisely on an "acceptable" level of
natural suffering is probably beyond us, even if we can agree that at least
some natural suffering is "not worth the candle". But a position, still a 
very radical one, that we could perhaps try to defend is that vast numbers 
of animals would probably be better off killed prematurely, but painlessly, 
by humans. If vast numbers of animals' lives are really as bad as that, 
then at least some unthinkable thoughts become thinkable.
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How bad, then, are wild animals' lives? By what criteria do we measure 
them? Unfortunately, we can't of course ask animals themselves. So. we have 
to make an assessment ourselves. An initial difficulty is that even 
suffering-free longevity, where animals are long-lived, may not after all 
provide the counterweight against eventual suffering that might make at 
least the lives of longer-lived animals worthwhile. Animals probably don't 
reflect much on past experiences. Probably, no matter how long-lived they 
are, their lives don't accumulate value to them - each day is day one. So 
why is one animal's suffering-free decade, followed by starvation, after 
all to be preferred to another animal's suffering-free year, followed by 
starvation?
Other things equal, creatures with short lives ahead of them needn't 
come to value their lives any less than creatures with long lives ahead 
would come to value theirs. (11) But perhaps we, from outside, have good 
reasons still to regard a long suffering-free animal life, ending in 
starvation suffering, as worthwhile, but a short suffering-free animal 
life, ending in starvation suffering, as not worthwhile.
What worthwhile something might be present in the pre-starvation lives 
of longer-lived wild animals that might not be present in the pre­
starvation lives of shorter-lived wild animals? Something that longer-lived 
animals themselves wouldn't value, or perceive as an advantage. Something 
that could enable longer-lived animals to better withstand their eventual 
starvation suffering? It seems this factor has to be the key. But first we
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will have to clear up a certain ambiguity in both the terms "longer-lived" 
and "shorter-lived". In absolute terms, animals of some species wouldn't 
live long even if we put them in Hargrove's "zoo or park". Even the 
potential lifespans of these animals are short. But, especially in a zoo or 
park, some of these animals might live long compared with other animals of 
their own species, which might routinely, in the wild, die much earlier - 
from predation, disease, or starvation. So "longer-lived" could mean 
"longer-lived of its kind", or it could mean "longer-lived absolutely". And 
so with "shorter-lived".
Already, with "longer-lived of their kind" animals, we see something 
obvious. It doesn't matter how short their lives are in absolute terms. 
They are adults. As such, they can often be untypical. It is overwhelmingly 
likely that any given dying lion, cheetah or robin (see earlier), dying 
from starvation, untreated disease or predatory attack, will be a child. In 
the human realm, we are particularly horrified and moved by the extreme 
suffering of children. It is very often with pictures of starving Third 
World children that charities like Oxfam and War On Want appeal to the 
hearts of people living in more affluent countries. Charities that are 
particularly successful in fund-raising are often child focused, e.g. The 
Save The Children Fund, The Children In Need Appeal, and a charity that 
even gets criticism from other charités for being too successful - The 
Great Ormond Street Children's Hospital Appeal, Britons have sometimes gone 
to extreme lengths just to "rescue" one child from a Romanian orphanage, or 
Bosnian battlefield. Often the thought behind child rescue is that children
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are particularly defenceless against extreme suffering; particularly 
terrified by it. Adults may have come to be a little more hardened against 
suffering. Perhaps if any animals' extreme suffering can be said to be 
tolerable, it will be the suffering of fully grown animals.
Provisionally at least, let's concede even that all fully grown wild 
animals' lives, irrespective of the suffering of these animals, can be saiid 
to be worthwhile. That is, they wouldn't be better off killed prematurely, 
but painlessly, by humans. What now follows from this?
: In some species, young animals may. tend to-survive longer than-their 
fellows in other species, because they get better protection. Predatory big 
cats are much less likely to want to provoke a fight with the mother of a 
young rhinoceros than the mother of a young gazelle. (Even though lions, 
for example, successfully prey on fully grown buffaloes.) So again we have 
a range of natural animal experience - at one end, young animals With some
chance of reaching adulthood, and with it, we hope, greater hardiness
against eventual suffering^ At the other end of the range, the routine, 
timeless, seemingly intractable feature of mass, violent infant mortality. 
It's here particularly where we are tempted to declare that animals would, 
on the whole, be better off not born at all. But we've provisionally said
that, even here, the lives of animals which do reach adulthood will be
considered- worthwhile.- So ' even - if "put ting the ÿouhgsterë' out df-' -theih 
miseries, or preventing their conception, would be humane, what about the 
adults? Generally, what about the few or many animals, in any given
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situation, which we might hesitate to declare "better off painlessly dead"? 
Or future animals whose lives we have implied would be worthwhile? 
Preventing conception of future young sufferers, say by declining to
captive-breed an endangered species, would also prevent the. conception of 
animal lives considered, by themselves, to be worthwhile. Actually, perhaps 
we don't have to be too bothered about which group are in the majority:
whether it's the animals considered better off alive, or the others. After
all, interests of any minorities are still morally important.
Barring human effect on nature, there will always be a high proportion
of wild animals destined to be born into lives so nasty, brutish and short
that, if they were humans, we wouldn't want to bring them into the world. 
There are only two sorts of change that will look likely. First, the 
relatively .slow, knock-on ,effeqts of ^ piecemeal human erosion of one lor .two 
species, probably from commercial motivation, in a local ecosystem. The
result might be, in the end, "less suffering, fewer lives" in that 
ecosystem. Second, the wholesale obliteration of local ecosystems. For
example, the destruction of rainforests, test nuclear explosions on 
seabird-inhabited islands. Otherwise, the continuance and conception of 
worthwhile animal lives looks inextricably linked to the continuance of
mass violent infant mortality, and nature's other horrors. Our problem then 
is, do we forever value the continuance of worthwhile animal life, forever 
at the cost of awful animal suffering? Or might we even think nature would 
be better off dead?
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There are many examples we could find of positive consequences being 
inextricably linked to negative consequences. For example, we value 
motorways, but motorways feature horrific accidents. What we generally seem 
to think is that even appalling suffering is best endured, just to preserve 
the lives that will preserve the hope,- feomewhere; ' that ' things will' get 
better. At least in the human realm. As Maureen Duffy said.
We shrink from the thought that it would have been better for every 
Jew to be shot on arrest rather than endure the living death of the 
concentration camps. (12)
It might have been difficult to implement suffering relief deaths for 
concentration camp inmates, even from the perspective of anti-Nazis: say. 
Allied Bomber Command. But what if somebody had had godlike powers?
Imagine a semi-omnipotent (k>d, "living" in 1943. He can't relieve 
suffering, except by painless killing of all sentient life on' Earth’ - 
sufferers and non-sufferers alike. He would thereby also prevent conception 
of any future sentient life. But if he does nothing, millions of Jews will 
continue to suffer and die horribly. Also, for good measure, so will 
millions of Gulag Archipelago victims, Japanese P. 0. W. camp inmates, and 
many, many, more. And animals, of course. And future sufferers. God's moral 
dilemma would be a variant on the traditional theological problem - would a 
good God have created a world with so much suffering in it? Even, perhaps. 
If no other world was possible?
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We probably wouldn't much bemoan the deaths of Nazis and prison camp 
torturers. And camp inmates, and other actual or would-be sufferers, would 
have their suffering relieved or prevented if God decides on painless 
"apocalypse now". But what about present or future innocent, non-suffering 
creatures, human or animal? Why might they have to forgo their lives?
Simply, it might be suggested, because their continued or created lives are 
or would be inextricably linked to an unacceptable price in suffering. Only 
God, in this example, can.relieyp the:suffering quickly and painlessly. But 
in the example he has to sacrifice the lives of innocent non-sufferers too.
If God takes a moral decision to enact painless apocalypse, his 
decision won't in fact be entirely without related precedent. In fact, it 
is in wartime when related moral dilemmas often occur.
Suppose we are fighting a "just war". Or at least, it started out that 
way. Eventually comes a time when it is clear that some crucial objective 
is attainable only by military action that would have its cost in
suffering, and also in innocent, presently non-suffering lives. (Or at 
least, tolerably-suffering lives.) Also, of course, this cost would entail 
a further cost: the prevention of future innocent; we hope non-suffering
lives. But not to take the military action in question would almost
certainly have worse consequences. Say, we would probably lose the war to a 
brutal and rapacious enemy which tortures any foreign or ethnic minority 
civilians it can lay its hands on.
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In the last example, we would probably reluctantly conclude that some, 
even a vast number, of innocent non-suffering lives would have to be 
sacrificed. Innocent "enemy" civilians, and arguably innocent "enemy" 
conscripts, almost inevitably die in attempts to defeat their rulers' 
military might. Large numbers of future babies won't be born that otherwise 
would have been. And of course, all this applies to civilians and soldiers, 
and future babies, on our own side. Innocent non-suffering lives will be 
lost if we fight a war at all. But I hope we would at least be fighting a 
war to stop worse consequences. Analogously, God, in the previous example, 
could perhaps be seen as sacrificing innocent, non-suffering lives to 
prevent intolerable suffering. Even if this means sacrificing all life.
Back to "less suffering, fewer lives" in nature. I can't see that, for 
example, the seabird-inhabited island is necessarily better off before the 
Trident missile arrives. My view will appal most people, because we have an 
entrenched view that nature is not only a good thing, but a wonderful 
thing. This view is complacent; an example of absurdly wishful thinking. 
Look at what's actually happening in nature. Until we are more critical, 
huge percentages of young animals must routinely, as Hargrove said,
... starve to death so as to preserve the natural character of the 
landscape. (13)
But for obvious reasons, we may not, all things considered, want to 
encourage "nuclear" natural suffering relievers!
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Conclusion
Let's first recapitulate all the evaluations, in Part 3, of accidental.
human effects on levels of natural suffering;
1. Less suffering, no fewer lives. Good.
2. Extra suffering, no extra lives. Bad.
We may want to be tentative in our evaluation of two other outcomes:
3. Less suffering, fewer lives. Perhaps good. Leading us to think:
4. Extra suffering, extra lives. (Where sustainable;.) Perhaps bad.
Or we may yet want to go so far as to agree with the words of J. S. Mill:
If a tenth part of the pains which have been expended in finding 
benevolent adaptations in all nature, had been employed in 
collecting evidence to blacken the character of the Creator, vrtiat 
scope for comment would not have been found in the entire existence 
of the lower animals, divided, with scarcely an exception, into 
devourers and devoured, and a prey to a thousand ills from which 
they are denied the faculties necessary for protecting themselves, (14)
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From Farts 1 and 2, it emerged that only one adequate objection had 
been found to the principle of deliberate natural suffering relief - the 
contingent objection that, at present, suffering relief time and energy 
would be better spent, even if only as a better suffering relief 
investment, trying to relieve suffering in the human realm. But from Part 
2, Section 3, it emerged that no adequate objection had been found to the 
principle of optimal natural suffering relief, should natural suffering 
ever come to constitute all suffering. So we have, it appears, no good 
moral reason to hold out indefinitely against deliberate, active natural 
suffering relief. But it also appears that we are not very moral; not moral 
enough, perhaps, ever to be enthusiastic about deliberate, active natural 
suffering relief. But our moral deficiencies certainly don't make a 
discussion of natural suffering relief entirely hypothetical - because 
"accidental" human effects on levels of natural suffering occur all the 
time. We can decide whether or not we think these effects are good things. 
Accordingly, we can either encourage or discourage them, or not stand in 
opposition to them if they are good, not participate in them if they are 
bad. I suggest that we start by drawing up a scheme of assessment of 
accidental human effects on levels of natural suffering like the scheme 
outlined in Part 3. I alsd suggest that we be prepared to do some hard 
thinking. For example, would we want to bring into the world a child which 
would probably barely pass its fifth birthday, and which would probably die 
either from being eaten alive, from starvation, or from painful untreated 
disease? Barring human effect on levels of natural suffering, comparable 
life chances await huge percentages of young animals.
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